Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

1-1-1998

Checkpoints on the Conversion Highway: Some Trouble Spots in
the Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care Organizations to ForProfit Status
James J. Fishman
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Organizations Law Commons, and the Tax Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
James J. Fishman, Checkpoints on the Conversion Highway: Some Trouble Spots in the Conversion of
Nonprofit Health Care Organizations to for-Profit Status, 23 J. Corp. L. 701 (1998),
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/68/.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Checkpoints on the Conversion Highway: Some Trouble
Spots in the Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care
Organizations to For-Profit Status
James J . Fishman*
I . INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 702
A. Section 501(c)(3) Organizations: "TraditionalNonprofits " .............................703
B. The Promotion of Health as a Tax Exempt Purpose ........................................ 703
I1 . WHENNONPROFITS
DISSOLVE
.................................................................................
705

...................................................................................................... 708
111. THE LANDSCAPE
A . Hospitals ...........................................................................................................708
B. Medicare and Medicaid ..................................................................................... 709
C. HMO Ownership Trends ................................................................................... 7 1 0
D. D~flerencesBetween Hospitals and HMOs ........................................................
711
E . Blue Cross Conversions .....................................................................................712

V . WHATIS A CONVERSION
M THE INTERNAL REVENUECODEAND
STATECHARITABLE
CORPORATION
LAW?...............................................................714
A . The Conversion in Place .................................................................................... 714
B. Asset Sales ..........................................................................................................714
C. Merger ................................................................................................................ 714
D. Drop-down Conversions .................................................................................... 715

VII . TROUBLE
SPOTS-PROBLEMS
AND CONVERSION
ISSUES.......................................717
717
A. Conflicts of Interest ............................................................................................
B. Valuation Issues .................................................................................................
718
721
C. Lack of Disclosure..............................................................................................
D. Financing ...........................................................................................................
724
E . How Much of the Organization's Value Should Remain
in the Public Domain? ........................................................................................
725
F . Who Should Regulate These Conversions-The Role of the
Attorney General ................................................................................................726
G. The Internal Revenue Service's Role ..................................................................
727
H. The New Foundations .........................................................................................
729
I. Cy Pres Issues Relating to the New Foundations ................................................731

Heinonline

..

23 J . Corp . L . 701 1997-1998

702

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Summer

J. Politics and the Conversion Process ...................................................................733

VIII. THE LEGALRESPONSE TO CONVERSIONS
..............................................................734
A. The Duty of Care ................................................................................................
734
B. The Business Judgment Rule as a Safe Harbor for Directors ............................735
C. The Duty of Loyalty ............................................................................................
735

IX. DEALINGWITHTHE CONVERSIONS:
THE STANDARD
OF
ENHANCED
SCRUTINY ..............................................................................................
737
APPENDIXA: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROTECTING
THE PUBLIC
WHENNONPROFIT
ASSETSARE TRANSFERRED
TO FOR-PROFIT
ENTITIES
...................... 739

I. INTRODUCTION
For the past few years, the United States has witnessed the largest redeployment of
charitable assets in the Anglo-American world since Henry VII closed the monasteries in
1536-1540 as formerly nonprofit health care providers are switching to for-profit status.
Conversions refer to a growing array of transactions that have in common the transformation of the core enterprise from a charitable undertaking to a for-profit venture. Billions of dollars in charitable assets have been redeployed from eleemosynary to profitseeking purposes, leading to a fundamental change in the structure of the American
health care system. The conversion of charitable health providers has created some of the
nation's largest private f0undations.l
This essay does not address the truly important policy issues: whether for-profit
healthcare should be allowed or en~ouraged;~
how the quality of care compares to nonprofits or what criteria should be used to evaluate the quality of care;3 or what the impact
of these conversions is on the communities they serve.4 It discusses less significant issues: those of process-how can we shape and control this tidal wave of change so that
the public will be served and charitable assets preserved to the maximum extent possible?
The focus is upon the valuation of these charitable assets; the appropriate process of con-

* James D. Hopkins Professor, Pace Law School. A.B., A.M. University of Pennsylvania, J.D., Ph.D.
New York University.
1. An estimated ninety foundations with total assets of $9.3 billion have been created from health care
conversions; the median asset size is $57 million. See Harris Meyer, A Lot is Not Enough; For Foundations
Spun Offby Hospital Sales, Even Billions Go Only So Far, 7 1 HOSP.
& HEALTHNETWORKS
30,30 (1997).
2. See generally David A. Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy, and Regulatory Follies, 23 J.
COW. L. 741 (1998); Malik M. Hasan, Letf End the Nonprofit Charade, 334 NEWENG.J. MED. 1055 (1996).
3. See John Copeland, Nonprofit Versus For-Profit Hospitals, 18 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 35 (1997)
(comparing "(1) the charitable care provided by hvo categories versus taxes forgiven or paid; (2) hospital
costs by type of hospital; and (3) hospital as a 'community institution"'); see also Gary 1. Young et al., Does
the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals Threaten Health Care for the Poor, HEALTH Am., Jan-Feb 1997, at 137
(examining "how the acquisition of nonprofit hospitals by investor-owned corporations affects acquired hospitals' provision of uncompensated care").
4. For a discussion of the public policy issues, see Gary Claxton et al., Public Policy Issues in Nonprofit
Conversions: An Overview, HEALTH AFF. Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 9; Bradford H. Gray, Conversion of HMOs and
Hospitals: What's at Stake?, HEALTH
AFF. Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 29 (discussing the public policy issues).
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version; how to protect the public; who should represent the public interest; and what, if
any, should be the legal response.
A. Section 501(c)(3) Organizations: "Traditional Nonprofirs "

There is a vast array of organizations in the United States that share the designation
"nonprofit." Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code provides twenty-seven different
organizational categories which exempt an organization from federal income t a x a t i ~ n . ~
These categories of tax exempt organizations include corporations, title holding companies, civic leagues, local associations of employees, business leagues, social clubs, and
organizations operated for religious, charitable, educational and similar purposes.
Over half of the 1.2 million charities registered with the Internal Revenue Service
~ tax code
are covered by section 501(c)(3) which consists of traditional ~ h a r i t i e s .The
states that these traditional charities must be organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purpose^.^ No part of their net earnings can inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and no substantial
part of their activities can include carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence ~ e ~ i s l a t i oThese
n . ~ traditional charities may not participate or intervene in political campaign^.^ Recognition as a 501(c)(3) charity is very valuable to organizations, because contributions to such charities are deductible by the donor from their personal or
corporate income.'o
B. The Promotion of Health as a Tax Exempt Purpose

From the time of the Elizabethan Statute of uses," the promotion of health has
been considered a charitable purpose, and in the United States, hospitals and other health
care providers have always been tax exempt.12 Non-profit hospitals seemed so much the
symbol of charitable purpose that many states specifically granted them exemption from
taxation.13 In the eighteenth century, the nonprofit hospital was often little more than an

5 . See I.R.C. $5 501(c)(I)-(27),501(d), 501(e), 501(f), 5Ol(k) (Supp. 1997).
6. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention
of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation. . . and which does not participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign on behalf of any. . . candidate for public office.

7.
8.
9.
lo.
11.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See I.R.C. 5 170 (1997).
43 Eliz., ch. 4 (1601).
12. Trusts for the promotion of health are charitable and have been upheld as such even when the beneSCOTT ON TRUSTS
5 372 (4th
fits were not exclusively limited to the poor. See 1V.A WILLIAM R. FRATCHER,
ed. 1989).
13. See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a
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almshouse where the homeless came to die.14 During the nineteenth century, nonprofit
hospitals were known as "voluntary" institutions-organized by religious societies,
heavily hnded by donations, and staffed by doctors who worked without compensation,
and nurses who worked for room and board as part of their lifetime commitment to a religious order devoted to caring for the poor.15
Through medical advances, changes in the payment system which made the
"voluntary" nature of the hospital a myth, and the emergence of for-profit competition,
hospitals retained their tax exempt status. However, the Internal Revenue Service's rationale for such status changed. Originally, the Treasury coupled exemption of health
care providers with charitable care to the underprivileged even though such providers received substantial income from paying patients.16 If a hospital provided care to indigent
patients to the extent of its financial ability, it would be considered an exempt entity.17
After mid-century, the voluntary nature of nonprofit hospitals eroded and came to
resemble more closely their proprietary counterparts as third party payors, primarily
Medicare and Medicaid, constituted the overwhelming source of revenues. In response to
urgings of the hospital industry to eliminate the charity care requirement, in 1969 the Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling 69-54518 which adopted a "per se" rule
of hospital exemption: an entity engaged in the promotion of health for the benefit of the
community who pursued a charitable purpose was tax exempt, even though a portion of
the community, such as indigents, was excluded from participation.19 Under this standard, some health maintenance organizations could be found eligible for section
501(c)(3) status?O Although the rationale for the continuation of nonprofit hospitals' tax
exempt status has been a subject of academic criticism and state court developments, the
exemption remains?
Donative Theory of Tax Eremption, 66 WASH.
L. REV. 307, 3 18 11.33(1991) (collecting authorities from many
states).
14. See Douglas M. Mancino, Income Tax Exemption of the Contemporary Nonprofir Hospital, 32 ST.
LOUISU. L. J. 1015, 1021 (1988).
15. Hall & Colombo, supra note 13, at 318.
16. See M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care and the Charitable Eremption, 80 MMN. L. REV.299,305 (1995).
17. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202,203.
18. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
19. See id. at 118. One of the examples used in this Revenue Ruling was that a tax exempt hospital must
maintain an emergency room open to all persons regardless of that person's ability to pay. However, in a later
ruling, the Service ruled that specialized hospitals (such as eye and cancer hospitals) qualified for section
501(c)(3) status despite the lack of an emergency room if other "significant factors" evidenced the hospitals'
commitment to community health care. See Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94. These significant factors included the existence of a broad based board of directors, an open medical staff policy, and treatment of Medicare and Medicaid patients. See id. at 95.
20. See Sound Health Assoc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 158, 191 (1978) (stating that a health maintenance organization which provided health care services to members on a fee paid basis and to nonmembers on a feefor-service basis, handled emergency cases without regard to membership status and provided free care and
reduced rate care to a limited number of indigent patients qualified as a charitable organization serving the
public interest as described in I.R.C. 5 501(c)(3)).
21. For scholarly criticisms, see generally Bloche, supra note 16; Hall & Columbo, supra note 13; Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Indushy, 93 HARV. L. REV.14 16 (1980); John D.
Colombo, Health Care Reform and Federal Tax Eremption: Rethinking the Issues, 29 WAKEFOREST L. REV.
215 (1994); Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. SchafTer, Tax Administration as Health Policy: Hospitals, the Internal
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Nonprofit organizations may outlive their purposes or utility to society. Declining
membership or financial difficulties may threaten survival. In order to obtain exemption
under section 501(c)(3), the nonprofit's articles of association must state that upon dissolution, the organization's assets are to be distributed for one or more exempt purposes,
to a governmental body for a public purpose.22 Such assets may also be distributed by a
court to another organization to be used in a manner that in the judgment of the court will
best accomplish the general purposes for which the dissolved organization was formed.23
This "organizational test" is not met if the articles or applicable state law provide that
the organization's assets upon dissolution would be distributed to its members or shareholder~.~~
Under state corporate law the general rule is that public charities must transfer their
assets on dissolution for charitable or similar
while mutual benefit organizations
may distribute their assets to members upon dissolution or in accordance with such other
plan provided by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws26
Although the procedures differ depending upon the jurisdiction, the process of dissolution typically involves a resolution by the board of directors and a plan of dissolution, which must be approved by an appropriate vote of the membership (typically two-

Revenue Service, and the Courts, 16 J . HEALTHPOL. POL'Y & L. 251 (1991). For developments concerning
the denial of state and local tax exemptions, see generally Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, 709
P.2d 265 (Utah 1985); Robert J. Hannen, Nonprofit Hospitals: Should They Continue to Receive a Charitable
Organization Tar Exemption Under Pennsylvania Law?, 28 DUQ.L. REV. 727 (1990); see also Janne G. Gallagher, When Local Governments Come Calling: The Movement to Tar Charities, 18 Exempt Org. Tax Rev.
25 (1997).
22. See Treas. Reg. 5 1.501(~)(3)-l(b)(4)(as amended in 1990).
23. See id.
24. However, even if the charter is not explicit, the test is met if state law requires that the organization's
assets must be dedicated to a charitable purpose on dissolution. See Rev Proc. 82-2, 1982-1 C.B. 367 contains
a list of states that provide for the distribution of a nonprofit's assets by operation of law in a manner that satisfies the organizational test requirement.
25. See REVISED
MODELNONPROFIT
CORPORATION
ACT 5 14.06(6) (1988) (stating that "a public benefit
or religious corporation [shall transfer] its assets: (i) to one or more persons described in section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code, or (ii) if the dissolved corporation is not described in section 501(c)(3), to one or
more public benefit or religious corporations"); CAL.COW. CODE5 5410 (West 1997) (stating that no corporation shall make any distribution); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFITCOW. L. 5 1005(a)(3)(A) (McKinney 1997)
("Assets received and held by the corporation for a purpose specified as Type B...shall be distributed to one or
more domestic or foreign corporations or other organizations engaged in activities substantially similar to
those of the dissolved corporation...."). See generally In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Society, 257 P.2d I
(Cal. 1953); In re Multiple Sclerosis Service Organization, 496 N.E.2d 861 (N.Y. 1986).
26. See REVISEDMODELNONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT 5 14.06(7) (1988); CAL. COW. CODE5 8717(b)
(West 1990) (stating that "[ilf the articles or bylaws do not provide the manner of disposition, the assets shall
be distributed among the members in accordance with their respective rights therein"); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
L. 8 1005(a)(3)(B). Some jurisdictions, such as Illinois and Oregon, have based their dissolution provisions on
section 46(c) of the original Model Nonprofit Act, which has been criticized for placing "no meaningful restrictions on distributions in dissolution beyond the ambiguous requirement that 'assets held by the corporation subject to limitations permitting their use only for charitable . . . or similar purposes' must be transferred
to other organizations 'engaged in activities substantially similar to those of the dissolving corporation."'
Henry Hansmann, Relorming Nonprojit Corporation Low, 129 U . PA. L. REV. 497, 575-579 (1981); see also
805 111. Comp. Stat 105l112.16 (1997); Ore. Rev. Stat. 5 61.530 (1997).
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thirds of votes cast). In corporations without members, the board will adopt the dissolution plan by resolution. Dissolution requires notice to creditors and involves payment of
liabilities and distribution of remaining assets. If the organization is a public charity the
plan will specify the distributees. In those cases the attorney general is notified and the
plan is submitted to a court for approval. This is often a perfunctory review, as the attorney general is overworked unless there is a particular public interest involved or the organization is notorious. If a regulatory agency has approved the formation of the organization, it will be notified and must approve the dissolution. Mutual benefit corporations
are subject to less supervision by the attorney general than public benefit corporations.
Upon the dissolution of a mutual benefit corporation, the assets remaining after creditors
have been paid normally will be distributed to the members.27
In determining whether to approve a plan of distribution proposed by a corporation's board, a court may consider: (1) the source of the funds to be distributed, whether
received through public subscription or under the trust provision of a will or other instrument; (2) the purposes and powers of the corporation as enumerated in its certificate
of incorporation; (3) the activities in fact carried out and services actually provided by
the corporation; (4) the relationship of the activities and purposes of the proposed distributee(s) to those of the dissolving corporation; and (5) the bases for the distribution
recommended by the board.28 A certificate of dissolution is then filed with the secretary
of state or appropriate state official.29
The law is clear that when an organization is exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the
Code, it must contribute its remaining assets to another 501(c)(3) organization. Normally, the requirement to distribute assets to another exempt organization is not a problem, because many nonprofits dissolve in an atmosphere of financial distress. Typically,
when a nonprofit dissolves, little is contributed to other organizations as a lack of assets
is the primary cause for most organizations' demise.30 In contrast, the assets at stake in
hospital and HMO conversions are enormous, and their valuation and disposition are
crucial elements in the transaction. Consider how the following example of the conversion of a California nonprofit health maintenance organization differed from the norm.

27. See REV. MODELNONPROFTT
COW. Act Ch. 14; N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
CORP. L. Arts. 10-11; CAL.

COW.CODECh. 15-16.
28. Multiple Sclerosis Service Organization, 496 N.E.2d at 862. If the organization is a mutual benefit
corporation, the plan of dissolution and distribution of assets must be submitted to a vote of the members.
29. After dissolution, the corporation carries on no activities except winding up of its affairs, preserving
and protecting assets, minimizing liabilities, discharging existing liabilities, disposing of properties that will
not be distributed in kind, and paying liabilities and distributing corporate assets in accordance with the specifications of the dissolution plan. If the organization has insufficient assets to cover its liabilities, the court may
appoint a receiver to preserve the assets.
30. See generally WILLIAMG . B O W ET AL.,THECHARITABLE
NONPROFTTS
(1994). Bowen examined
the differences between nonprofit and for-profit dissolutions. First, nonprofits are more likely to resist closure
and simply hold on in the face of economic setbacks than for-profits, which may see economic and tax benefits in combinations or liquidations. Second, nonprofits with substantial assets are less likely to close than
other nonprofits. See id. at 99:There may be greater pressures to keep nonprofits in existence than for profitseeking entities. Thus, many nonprofits survive too long, drawing down their resources to finance annual deficits, or they stay alive on the basis of faded but still useful reputations. Boards may be embarrassed to close or
to seek a merger with a stronger organization. See id.
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Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) offer comprehensive primary health
care through physicians who are employees or partners, or through arrangements with
groups of physicians on a cost efficient basis to subscriber members on a prepaid fee
contract.31 The Family Health Program (FHP) was founded in 1961 as a nonprofit HMO
by Dr. Robert Gumbiner and offered prepaid medical and dental care through a network
of 22 company-operated clinics in Southern California, Utah, and Guam as well as
through contractual arrangements with physicians in Arizona and New Mexico. FHP received the benefits of tax exemption. Federal loans and grants then available to nonprofit
HMOs enabled expansion.
In February 1985, when it first applied for conversion to for-profit status, the board
of directors valued its assets at approximately $13.5 million as of June 30, 1984. Gumbiner and seventeen other investors including other board members founded HMO
Health Group, Inc. (HGI) as the for-profit purchaser of FHP's assets. Gumbiner owned
50.5% of HGI. The California Department of Corporations rejected the $13.5 million
figure and proposed $47 million as the fair market value. The Department and FHP then
negotiated a $38.5 million price which included $7.2 million in cash, and the rest paid
over ten years.32
Another for-profit HMO, Maxicare Health Plans, made a competing offer to buy
FHP for $50 million and sued to prevent HGI's conversion of FHP. Maxicare was joined
by the California Attorney General who urged that FHP be required to accept the highest
offer. At the time both the president of Maxicare and FHP's own documents indicated
that FHP's fair market value might have been substantially higher. The court permitted
the conversion to HGI holding that the law did not require sale to the highest bidder.33 A
foundation was established to receive the money used to purchase the HMO.
Eight months after the conversion, HGI floated an initial public offering of stock
with a market value of $150 million. Approximately $25.3 million went to the for-profit
HMO and just under $10.6 million went to the FHP Foundation, established as part of the
c o n ~ e r s i o n ."The
~ ~ former managers, including Dr. Gumbiner, continued to hold a
75.9% stake in the for-profit company worth $1 14 million."35 These assets belong to the
31. See CAL.HEALTH & SAFETYCODE5 437.03 (West 1990) (repealed 1995); MICH.COMP.LAWANN.
5 333.20106(2) (West 1997); N.Y. PUB.HEALTHLAW5 4401(1) (McKinney 1997) (defining HMOs).

32. See Michele Meldin & Jane Perkins, HMO Conversions: How to Disbibute the Charitable Assets, 21
REV. 467,468 (1987); Robert Hanley, Offering Puts FHP Corp's Value at Six Times Its PurCLEARINGHOUSE
chase Price, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 1985 at Pt. 4, l ; Jube Shiver, Jr., Judge Oks FHP's Buy-out Plan, Thwarting Maxicare, L.A. TIMES,Oct. 19, 1985 at Pt. 4, 1; State Suit Seeks G@ to Charity by FHP Oflcers, L.A.
TIMES,Dec. 3, 1986 at Pt. 4, 1.
33. See Maxicare Health Plans v. Gumbiner, No. C-565072 (Los Angeles Superior Courf 1986).
34. See JAMESJ. FISHMAN& STEPHENSCHWARZ,
NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS:
CASESAND MATERIALS
104 (1995).
35. Id. Nor is this the only example of executive largesse during a conversion. When HealthNet, now
named Health Systems International, converted in 1992, thirty-three executives purchased twenty percent of
the company for $1.5 million. Those shares were worth $3 15 in April 1996. The former CEO paid $30,000 for
shares later worth $31 million. See Judith E. Bell, Saving Their Assets; How to Stop Plunder at Blue Cross
and Other Nonprofits, AMERICANPROSPECT, May-June 1996 at 60, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Mag
File (discussing how executives have made millions converting nonprofits). HGI has since been taken over by
a larger firm further enriching its shareholders. There have been other troubling examples: a hospital sale was
negotiated and consummated in less than four weeks; a health system fired twelve trustees of a local hospital
after they voiced opposition to a proposed sale to a for-profit system; and there are several incidents where
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public, not to a nonprofit's managers. Gumbiner & associates used the nonprofit form to
receive private inurement.

Conversions are neither new, nor are they confined to the health care field, despite
the media attention and state regulatory focus on hospitals and HMOs. The category of
charitable organizations susceptible to conversion is much broader. It includes virtually
any exempt organization that provides products or services for which there is a significant market-such as nonprofit book publishers, nonprofit television stations, as well as
tax exempt biotechnology research institute^.^^ Health care conversions have occurred
within HMOs, exempt hospitals acquired by proprietary enterprises, and spin-offs of
Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance plan assets into taxable s ~ b s i d i a r i e sConversions
.~~
occurred among hospitals and HMOs for many years without attracting much a t t e n t i ~ n . ~ ~
A. Hospitals

Three ownership types of hospitals have long coexisted: public, charitable, and forprofit. Public hospitals are owned and operated by a governmental unit. Charitable hospitals, frequently termed "voluntary hospitals," originally were organized by religious
societies, and heavily funded by donations. These voluntary hospitals were staffed by
doctors who worked without compensation and nurses who worked for room and
board.39 For-profit hospitals, on the other hand, are owned by shareholders. At the turn
of the twentieth century, approximately half of all hospitals were small, proprietary orinsiders benefited from sales to proprietary firms. See Eric S. Tower, Directors' Duty to Obtain a Fair Price in
the Conversion of Nonprofit Hospitals, 6 ANNALSHEALTH L. 157, 158 (1997).
36. Reverend Pat Robertson and his family purchased a controlling interest in the programming subsidiary of the Christian Television Network for $183,000 in 1989. It went public in 1992 and its shares were
worth $90 million. Reverend Robertson and his family retained majority control. In June of 1997, Rupert
Murdoch agreed to purchase International Family Entertainment, Inc., which was still controlled by the Robertson family, for $1.9 billion. See Geraldine Fabrikant, Murdoch Set to Buy Family Cable Concern, N.Y.
TIMES,
June 12, 1997, at Dl.
37. Note that there also have been conversions of for-profits to nonprofit status. See DOUGLAS
M.
hhNCINO, TAXATION
OF HOSPITALS
AND HEALTH CAREORGANIZATIONS 21-28 (1995 & Supp. 1997). These
include medical practice groups acquired by integrated delivery systems, freestanding medical groups or clinics, and hospitals that formed for-profit subsidiaries to engage in certain ventures that now wish to change the
tax status of such subsidiaries. See id. Conversion of for-profits to nonprofits allow the new nonprofits to: (a)
receive and accumulate income from exempt activities tax free; (b) receive charitable contribution on a taxdeductible basis, see I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1997); (c) gain access to the tax exempt bond market; (d) avoid
"phantom income" from services provided to related organizations; (e) reduce federal payroll taxes; (0avoid
paying state property taxes; (g) achieve the prestige and philanthropic support associated with nonprofit,
charitable status ("the halo effect"); (h) provide tax-sheltered annuities; (i) avoid paying certain federal excise
taxes, see John D. Colombo, Health Care Reform and Federal Tar Exemption: Rethinking the Issues, 29
WAKEFOREST
L. REV. 215 (1994); 0)participate in shared service organizations (hospitals); (k) receive preferred postal rates and certain sales tax exemptions; (I) avoid Robinson-Patman Act federal price discrimination law; and (m) receive other miscellaneous benefits.
38. See Bradford H . Gray, Conversion of Nonprofit Health Plans and Hospitals: An Overview of the IsTRANSACTIONS:
CHANGING
BETWEENNONPROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT
sues and the Evidence, in CONVERSION
FORM 1 (National Center on Philanthropy and the Law 1996).
39. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 13, at 317-18.
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ganizations owned by physicians as an adjunct to their medical practices. For-profit
community hospitals declined to about fifteen percent of all community hospitals by
1965,40 the dawn of Medicare and Medicaid, federal programs of reimbursement for elderly and others.41

B. Medicare and Medicaid
Unlike virtually every other industrialized nation, the United States still lacks a program that makes health care comprehensively available to all of its citizens. It does have
Medicare, introduced in 1966, which covers hospital care for those over 65 and some
others such as the long term disabled.42 A second voluntary Medicare program covers
certain outpatient costs. Though limited in scope, these programs are enormously expensive.
Medicaid is a cooperative federal and state program that finances health care for
certain poor people. Nationwide, about 52% of persons with income levels below the
~ government contributes 50 to 83%
federal poverty limit are covered by ~ e d i c a i d . 4The
of the cost of Medicaid with the states covering the rest.44 Both Medicare and Medicaid
are enormously expensive, and, by and large, the government, as third party payor, foots
the bill.
For-profit hospitals were jump-started by Medicare. The programs also encouraged
mergers. The most dramatic trends occurred between the mid-1960s and early 1980s with
the growth of hospital management companies, such as the Hospital Corporation of
America and American Medical International. These companies were created postMedicare, but their growth stopped by the early 1980s because of changes in Medicare
reimb~rsement.4~
There were few hospital conversions in the first golden age of the investor-owned hospital.46 From the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, the overall for-profitnonprofit public composition of the hospital industry changed remarkably little, perhaps
one percent of the
The conversion of nonprofit health providers to for-profit status received its greatest
impetus with the emergence and aggressiveness of ColumbialHCA. Columbia Hospital
Systems was formed in 1987. Within a decade it grew to a corporation with $20 billion in
revenues which owned approximately 350 hospitals, 500 health care ofices and scores of
other medical businesses in 38 states.48 Columbia not only expanded by acquiring for40. See Gray, supra note 38, at 21 (citing American Hospital Association Hospital Statistics (1995)).
4 1 . See Gray, supra note 38, at 13-14.
42. 42 U.S.C. $5 1395-1395ccc (1994). For an excellent summary of these programs, see Barry R. Furrow et al., Health Law, § 13 (1995).
43. See Furrow, supra note 42,§ 14.01.
44. See id.
45. See Gray, supra note 38, at 14-16.
46. Between 1980-1993 there were a total of 647 convenions: 197 were conversions to for-profit (some
were government hospitals); 119 o f these were nonprofit to for-profit; and 79 conversions were for-profit to
nonprofit. See Gray, supra note 38, at 18 (citing Deborah 1. Chollet et al., Conversion of Hospitals and Health
Plans to For-Profit Status: A Preliminary Investigation of Community Issues. Washington: Alpha Center, May

1996).
47. See Gray, supra note 38, at 19-20.
48. See Martin Gottlieb &-Kurt Eichenwald, Health Care's Giant, NEW YORKTIMES, May 11, 1997, 5 3,
at 1.
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profit hospitals, in 1995, they acquired thirty-three tax exempt hospitals as well. In 1996,
seventeen of its twenty-eight acquisitions or joint ventures involved tax exempt hospitals
~~
with an additional fourteen pending.49 Despite the recent humbling of ~ o l u m b i aand
the slow down of the conversion process, the underlying rationales of efficiency and cost
containment remain.51

C. HMO Ownership Trends
Though prepaid medical services have existed since the 18th century, in the second
half of the 20th century their use widened because HMOs were seen as devices to hold
down the ever-increasing cost of health care. Through the Health Care Maintenance Act
~ federal govemment served as a venture capitalist for nonprofit HMOs,
of 1 9 7 3 , ~the
providing loans and financial guarantees. Because of the availability of federal assistance, nonprofit HMOs dominated. In 1983 the federal loan programs ceased, and HMOs
with growing capital needs began to convert to for-profit status.53

49. See Bruce Japsen, Another Record Yearfor Dealmaking: Activity Among Medium-Size CompaniesFuels Continued Drive Toward Consolidation, MODERNHEALTHCARE,
Dec. 23, 1996 at 37. The 1995 year
end review of mergers and acquisitions by Modem Healthcare indicated that 48 nonprofit hospitals had converted or planned to convert to for-profit status in 1995. In 1996, only 8% or 63 of the hospitals that merged
converted to for-profit status. See Demise of the Not-jor-Profit Has Been Greatly Exaggerated, MODERN
Dec. 23, 1996, at 33.
HEALTHCARE,
50. See Lucette Lagnado and Joann S. Lublin, Columbia/HCA Sets $71 Million Accord With IRS to Settle Compensation Dispute, WALLST. J., Dec. 4, 1997, at B8; Kurt Eichenwald and N.R. Kleinfield, How
Scandal Put an End to the Flag- Waving, N.Y. TIMES,Dec. 21, 1997, 5 3, at 1; Kurt Eichenwald, US. Contends Billing Fraud at Columbia was 'Systematic',N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1997, at D l ; Kurt Eichenwald, 3 Executives of Hospital Chain Charged With Medicare Fraud, N.Y. TIMES,July 31, 1997, at Al; Lucette
Lagnado, Columbia Inquiry YieldF First Indictment: Insurance Companies Start an Independent Probe Into
Billing Practices, WALLST. J., July 31, 1997, at A3. Federal and state authorities have been reviewing billing
practices at the home health care division as well as the coding of patients' diagnoses for Medicare reimbursement. These investigations, which involve much of the hospital chain, have prompted Medicare to stop
signing off on annual claim audits to leave as many cases open as possible. Columbia settled a dispute with
Alabama's Medicaid program for $40 million. Because of projected settlements and fines, bond rating agencies have placed Columbia/HCA debt under review for a potential downgrade. See Keith A. Markey, ColumbiaIHCA, Valueline Investment Survey, Ian. 2, 1998, at 653. The negative publicity has taken a toll on admissions, as doctors, who had customarily referred a portion of their patients to Columbia, have begun to send
business elsewhere.
5 1. See Anita Sharp, Entrepreneurs Look to Profit on Nonprofit Hospitals, WALLST. J., Feb. 2, 1998, at
B4 (discussing new groups of entrepreneurs who seek to purchase nonprofit hospitals); see generally, Lawrence E . Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: The State and Federal Response to Hospitals' Changes in
Charitable Status, 23 AM. J.L. & MED.221 (1997). Bradford Gray has offered six policy reasons for encouraging conversions: 1) to facilitate health coverage of the uninsured because the supercession of the nonprofit
form would force the government to provide health care; 2) to move more organizations onto the tax rolls; 3)
to move charitable assets to more productive uses; 4) to enhance access to needed capital; 5) to facilitate consolidation and reduction of capacity; and 6) to end the 'fiction' that nonprofits are more socially beneficial
than their for-profit counterparts. Gray, however, concludes that the nonprofit form continues to hold significant advantages over the proprietary form in health care. See Bradford H. Gray, Conversion of HMOs and
Hospitals: What's at Stake?, HEALTHAFFAIRS,
Mar.-Apr., 1997,29,33-34.
52. 42 U.S.C. 55 300e-300e-14a (1994).
53. See Claxton, supra note 4, at 12. In 1981, 82% of HMOs, accounting for 88% of overall membership, were nonprofit. By 1995, the proportion of nonprofit plans had decreased to 29%, accounting for 41% of
overall membership. See id.
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D. Differences Between Hospitals and HMOs
Investor ownership of hospitals emerged late in a mature field. The ownership picture of HMOs has been heavily influenced by the rapid growth in the field over the past
two decades. Only one percent of nonprofit hospitals have converted to for-profit status,
whereas one third of HMOs have converted to for-profit status. Why have so few hospitals converted to for-profit status compared to HMOs? The hospital as an institution has a
more longstanding and significant place in most communities. Sales to for-profit chains
have been contentious because ownership by national investor-owned f m s threaten a
valuable community institution by replacing local control with new distantly determined
standards. Additionally, the charitable hospital has been an elite eleemosynary institution.
Historically, hospital boards constituted important philanthropic activities of the most influential and powerful members of the local power structure.54
Where possible, most conversions to for-profit status are negotiated in private. The
HMO conversions did not generate the same concerns because HMO boards were more
likely to be composed of insiders. HMO boards were entrepreneurial and less representative of the broader community than hospitals. Conversions began at the time of increasing demand, so HMOs did not have to fight valued community institutions for market
share.55 The Internal Revenue Service's concern over HMOs led to restrictive requirements for tax e ~ e m p t i o nand
, ~ ~when capital resources dried up, the for-profit form became attractive.
Despite the controversial reactions by the communities in which they are located,
there are enormous temptations for local hospitals to convert. Too many hospital beds for
too few patients engenders competition between hospitals. For-profit chains using
economies of scale and instituting administrative efficiencies are able to provide services
.~'
capital requirements for new equipment
for less than nonprofit c ~ u n t e r ~ a r t sIncreasing
necessary to attract patient business place many nonprofit hospitals at a competitive disadvantage. Investment bankers have spoken to trustees regarding the "monetizing [of]
the community hospital asset."58 The economic argument runs as follows: the law of
comparative advantage postulates that resources, dollars, people, and business have a
best use. Society or the community is better off when that best use is realized.59 By converting former nonprofit hospitals to for-profit, the theory is that capital in bricks and
mortar has been released for a better social use. Community hospital boards faced with a
parlous financial situation and induced by what seems to be huge sums have sold their
hospitals too quickly, at too low a value with little community input.

54. See Gray, supra note 38, at 29.
55. Seeid. at31.
56. See Sound Health v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 158 (1978) (granting an HMO tax exempt status when it
sewed the public interest and was not engaged in providing a form of insurance); see also Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,829 (Aug. 25, 1990) (granting tax exempt status to HMO); but see Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (Aug. 24,
1990) (failing to grant tax exempt status to HMO); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,830 (Aug. 24, 1990)(same).
57. See Singer, supra note 51, at 230.
58. Daniel M. Cain, Introduction to Bridging the Transitionfrom Community Hospital to Charitable
Foundation: An Emerging Force in Social Change, STRATEGIES
IN CAPITAL
FIN.,Spring 1996 at 1.
59. See generally Craig Havighurst, Solid Foundations, 29 Health Sys. Rev. 33 (1996) mailable in
LEXIS, BusFin Library, ABI File.
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E. Blue Cross Conversions
Blue Cross is an insurance plan for the less affluent. Hospitals established Blues
plans as not-for-profits in the 1930s to ensure that patients would have the means to pay
for care. For years, Blues enjoyed regulatory and tax exemptions because of their social
mission.60 Generally Blue Cross took greater risks than other insurers. It used to be said
that Blues' claims departments' mission was to figure out how not to reject the claim but
how to pay it.
There are nearly sixty independent Blue Cross plans serving nearly seventy million
people in widely differing markets.61 There were nearly 100 such plans a few years ago,
but competitive pressures caused by the growth of managed care plans and drastically
increased capital needs have led to waves of mergers and attempted conversions to forprofit status.62 This is a time of tumult and change as Blues are merging, affiliating in
consortia, creating for-profit subsidiaries, and converting to for-profit status.63 Critics say
these conversions are siphoning billions into investors' and executives' pockets. Several
plans have converted to for-profit status or announced conversion plans.64 Other Blues
are merging, which may be a prelude to for-profit c o n v e r ~ i o n The
. ~ ~ reasons for conversion correlate to those of hospitals and HMOs: a need for more capital and new competit i ~ nIn. the
~ ~case of Blues plans, the competition has come from HMOs, which through
expansion have siphoned off customers from Blue Cross. In New York State, Empire
Blue Cross lost five million subscribers to HMOs in a few years.67
Some regulators have objected to Blue Cross conversions. These critics contend that
the Blues Plans were established as nonprofits because of their public mission, and that
they are essentially owned by the public. Therefore, the public should receive money for
their conversions rather than private individuals, and Blues' assets should not be used as
seed money for for-profit ventures.

IV. CAUSESOF CONVERSION
TO FOR-PROFIT
STATUS
Conversions of nonprofit health care providers allow the new for-profits to: avoid
increased Internal Revenue Service regulation and scrutiny; take advantage of current

60. See PAULSTARKTHESOCIAL
TRANSFORMATIONOF AMERICAN
MEDICINE298 (1982).
6 1. See Liz Runge, The Blues are Learning Some New Tunes, 97 Best's Rev.-Life-Health
Insur. ed 60
(Mar.1997), available in LEXIS, News Library, BRLIFE File.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Four are completed. Others are in the process. Blues in Colorado, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New

York are in various stages of conversion. See Claxton, supra note 4, at 11-12. Three other Blues' plansWisconsin, Indiana, and Missouri-have owned publicly traded managed care subsidiaries for several years.
See Louise Kertesz, Not Your Father's Blue Cross, Modem Healthcare, October 14, 1996, at 68.
65. Most Blue Cross Plans have formed wholly-owned, for-profit subsidiaries offering a spectrum of
products.
66. Blues lost their federal tax exempt status in 1986 because the provision of commercial-type insurance as a substantial part of an organization's activities was no longer an exempt activity. See Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2390 (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. $5 501(m), 833 (1986)).
67. See Milt Freudenheim, Empire Blue Cross Seeking to Become For-Profir Group, N.Y. TIMES,Sept.
26, 1996, at A1; Milt Freudenheim, Crisis Looms as Big Insurer Keeps Sliding, N.Y. TIMES,Aug. 28, 1994, at
$ 1,31.
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operating losses; compete better and seek profits aggressively; provide equity incentives
to service providers, such as physicians; engage in unlimited lobbying and political activity; take advantage of private and public equity capital markets; and allow weaker
hospitals to consolidate and replace antiquated equipment and heavy debt load.
The fundamental reason for health care providers' moves to for-profit status is easier access to capital.68 Historically, nonprofit health care organizations raised capital
through the use of tax exempt financing, which enabled nonprofit health care borrowers
to pay a lower cost of interest than if the regular capital markets were used. In the early
1980s, there were significant savings over entering the taxable bond market. A second
benefit from tax exempt financing was arbitrage investment profits. The proceeds from
tax exempt financing were invested in taxable securities earning a greater rate of interest-the profits of which went to the exempt organization. Congress caught up with this
and required that if a nonprofit borrowed with tax exempt bonds, it could not reinvest the
funds to receive a taxable rate of interest.69 Still, there were loopholes.
One loophole was the incentive to borrow in advance of one's need. Institutions
would invest in for-profit vehicles and then use the dollars when they needed them.
Much of the overcapitalization and the overbuilding in the hospital sector resulted from
the use of this technique. The money was there and could be used for certain periods of
time for anything, but eventually hospitals had to build something. Thus, there was a
great incentive to borrow.
The 1986 Tax Reform Act changed and limited the use of tax exempt financing.
Pre-1986, twenty-five percent of tax exempt bonds could be used for unrelated business
operations. These might include physicians' offices, management contracts with private
companies and cooperative ventures. Now there is a five-percent limit on unrelated business operation^.^^ There was also a $150 million limit imposed on any section 501(c)(3)
organization that borrows money for other than hospital purposes.7'
These tax law changes made tax exempt financing less valuable to the nonprofit and
limited a hospital's flexibility. Additionally, the spread between tax exempt financing
and for-profit financing (which was 70430% in the 1980s) moved to 8590% in the
1990s, narrowing the significance of interest savings. The tax exempt marketplace became over-saturated with tax exempt paper of financially weak hospitals, leading to a
downgrading by bond rating agencies and making the regular capital markets more comparable in terms of the cost of borrowing. All in all, the desirability of nonprofit status
diminished for hospitals, and their competitive position vis a vis for-profits deteriorated
as the latter had easier access to capital.72
68.
69.
70.
71.

See Mancino, supra note 37, at 21-7.
See I.R.C. 5 148 (1986).
See 1.R.C. 5 145(a) (1997).
See id.; 5 145(b)(2)(C). The $150 million borrowing limit was a restriction on mergers of nonprofit
hospitals. This was prospectively repealed for capital expenditures by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, sec.
222, P.L. 105-34 (Aug. 5, 1997), effective the date of enactment. Specifically, new paragraph (5) of Internal
Revenue Code section 145(b) ("$150,000,000 Limitation on Bonds Other Than Hospital Bonds") reads:
(5) Termination of Limitation. This subsection shall not apply with respect to bonds issued
after the date of the enactment of this paragraph as part of an issue 95 percent or more of the net
proceeds of which are to be used to finance capital expenditures incurred after such date.
One cannot overestimate the economic importance of shifts in the tax laws.
72. See Singer, supra note 51, at 227-28 (concluding that "the exempt hospital, having reached its use
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IN THE INTERNAL
REVENUE
CODEAND STATECHARITABLE
V. WHATIS A CONVERSION

CORPORATION
LAW?^^
A. THECONVERSION
IN PLACE
A conversion in place refers to a process by which the board recommends an
amendment to the corporation's articles of incorporation, deleting its nonprofit aspects
and adding for-profit powers.74 The newly converted for-profit corporation is empowered to issue stock, permitted to conduct all lawful business, and allowed to pay divid e n d ~ In
. ~a~conversion in place the legal entity remains in place, the "xyz charitable
corporation" merely becomes the "xyz business corporation." Existing contractual relationships remain. The conversion in place is permitted only in a few states.76 Typically, it
is favored by HMOs, preferred provider organizations, and other managed care organizations not dependent on fixed assets like real property.

B. Asset Sales
Another conversion approach is a sale of assets, whereby a nonprofit corporation,
exempt under section 50 l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, sells its operating assets to
a for-profit corporation for fair market value. Unlike a conversion in place, an asset sale
requires the for-profit to obtain appropriate state licenses. After the sale, the for-profit
corporation owns the charitable corporation's assets, which in return may receive stock,
notes, or other property in addition to cash as consideration. This transaction structure is
. ~ ~ and
typical for the acquisition of a nonprofit hospital by a for-profit a ~ q u i r e rFederal
state laws require that the proceeds from the sale continue to be held in charitable trust
and used for charitable purposes.78 Foundations are usually the post-conversion holders
of these charitable assets.
C. Merger

Another technique for conversion involves a merger of a nonprofit corporation into
a for-profit. The charity forms a new for-profit corporation to which it contributes its assets in exchange for cash, notes, and stock. Thereafter, the nonprofit corporation merges

restriction ceiling, may find itself pitted against an organization with a seemingly endless capital supply").
For nonprofit HMOs, tax exempt debt was unavailable after 1983 for new product development, geographic
expansion, or acquisitions. See MANCINO,supra note 37, at 21.01-5.
73. See WNCmO, supra note 37, at 21-7 to 21-9 (developing this typology); see generally Thomas Silk,
Conversions of Tax-Erempt Nonprofir Organizations: Federal Tax Law and State Charitable Law Issues, 13
EXEMPTORG.TAXREV.745 (1996).
74. Typically, the board will recommend an amendment and the members, if there are any, must approve.
75. The fundamental distinction between a charitable nonprofit and a business corporation is the nondistribution constraint. For example, the nonprofit cannot distribute its earnings to members or shareholders. See
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprojit Enterprise, 89 YALEL.J. 835, 838 (1980); REV. MODEL
NONPROFIT
COW. ACT 8 13.01 (1988);CAL.COW. CODE 8 5410 (West 1997).
76. Arizona, California, Pennsylvania, Utah and Virginia. WNCINO, supra note 37, at 21-7.
77. It is common that the for-profit will purchase selected assets, usually the most profitable assets.
78. See supra notes 22 and 25 and accompanying text.
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into the for-profit c ~ r p o r a t i o nHere
. ~ ~ again, state and federal laws require the exchange
proceeds to remain in the charitable stream and to be used for charitable purposes. A
foundation or nonprofit corporation is created to receive the cash or stock from the surviving corporation. After the conversion, there are ordinarily two organizations: the forprofit corporation and a private foundation.

D. Drop-down Conversions
Drop-down conversions involve the transfer of some or all of the operating assets
and liabilities of a hospital or HMO to a wholly or partially owned subsidiary in exchange for stock andlor notes. This approach is used when an organization, such as an
i t . ~ ~the transaction
HMO, desires to convert some or all of its assets into a f ~ r - ~ r o f After
is completed, the for-profit subsidiary may enter the equity markets through an initial
public offering.
In a drop-down, the original owner of the assets usually retains a substantial percentage of equity in the newly formed corporation. This type of conversion, when used
by an HMO, is usually a preliminary step to another form of transaction, such as a takeover by another health plan. Some Blue Cross plans have argued that they do not need to
transfer any assets to charity, as the nonprofit remains in e ~ i s t e n c e After
. ~ ~ the conversion, three organizations may exist: in addition to the for-profit corporation and the foundation, a section 501(c)(4) organization may be created to receive and hold the stock for
later sale and to remit the proceeds to the foundation.

VI. MAJORLEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS SECTOR-SHIFT
The shift to for-profit status has highlighted the inadequacy of state conversion procedures. Several jurisdictions have responded by strengthening and slowing the conversion process.82 California, for example, addressed the inadequacy of its conversion procedures by enacting legislation that requires the conversion price to be at fair market
79. This is permitted in a few states: Arizona, California, and Virginia. MANCINO,supro note 37, at 21-8.
80. In 1993, Blue Cross of California transferred a substantial percentage of its operating assets to Wellpoint Healthcare, a wholly owned for-profit subsidiary. See inra Part V1I.E.
81. See infra notes 144-146.
82. See Aruz. REV. STAT.5 10-2592 (1997); CALCORP. CODE5 5914 (West 1997); GA. CODEANN. 4
14-3-1041 (Harrison 1994); LA. REV. STAT.ANN. 4 2115.11 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 13-B, 5
904 (West 1995); NEB.REV. STAT.4 71-20,108 (1996); N.H. REV. STAT.ANN. 5 420-A:17 (1995); OHIOREV.
CODEANN. 5 109.34 (Baldwin 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 27-19-29 (1994); VA. CODEANN. 5 38.24204.1
(Michie 1994); WASH.
REV. CODEANN. 5 24.03.195 (West 1996). For pending legislation see S. Res. 283,
77th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997) (the regular session adjourned on May 27, 1997 and the bill carried
over to the 1998 regular session); H. Res. 287, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997) (regular session adjourned on
April 7, 1997 and the bill was not carried over); S. Res. 1722, 181st Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997) (This
bill was submitted to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means); S. Res. 149, 89th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 1997) (This bill was submitted to the Senate Committee on Health Policy and Senior Citizens); S. Res.
327, 89th Gen. Assembly, 1997 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997) (The regular session adjourned on May 16, 1997
and the bill was not carried over); S. Res. 1550, 207th Leg., 1996 1st Annual Sess. (N.J. 19976 (This bill was
submitted to the Senate Committee on Human Services); S. Res. 1056, Sess. of 1997 (N.C. 1997) (The regular
session adjourned, and the bill was not carried over); S. Res. 279,46th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 1997) (The 1997
regular session adjourned, and the bill was carried over to 1998 regular session); H. Res. 1923, 100th Gen.
Assembly (Tenn. 1997) (The regular session adjourned, and the bill was carried over to 1998 regular session).
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value, the assets resulting from the conversion to be held by an independent foundation,
and the converting organization to have in place policies prohibiting conflicts of intere ~ tOther
. ~ jurisdictions
~
are trying to deal with this sector shift by improving monitoring
in an area which has been largely self-regulated. Nebraska has passed legislation regulating the sale of hospitals to ensure disclosure of conflicts of interest, sale at fair value,
and proper use of charitable assets.84
Another product of the conversion wave has been the reawakening of the role of the
state attorney general in the regulation of charities. In Massachusetts the attorney general's office used its historic powers of oversight to shape the conversion process.85 California increased the role of the attorney general to control and monitor c ~ n v e r s i o n s . ~ ~
Attorneys general in other states have also attempted to become involved in the conversion process.87 Publicity has been a great catalyst. However, most attorneys general have
little experience and are overmatched by for-profit converters' experts and counsel.
Another result of this healthcare sector shift has been the revitalization of the cy
pres doctrine. The theory of cy pres is that when a charitable purpose becomes impossible, inexpedient, impracticable of fulfillment or already accomplished, equity will permit
the trustee to substitute another charitable object which approaches the original purpose
as closely as possible.88 In modifying the trust's purpose, the court must follow the donor's original purpose cy pres comme possible-Norman French for "as near as possible."89 The power of modification has been strictly construed.90
Cy pres comes into play at two points in the conversion process. The first is in determining whether assets which were given for nonprofit purposes can be used in a conversion or even in a joint venture with a for-profit. Generally, if a nonprofit hospital, an
HMO, or Blue Cross proposes to sell its assets or enters into a whole hospital joint venture, the charity must seek advance court approval in a cy pres type action.91 A Michigan
trial court judge ruled that a joint venture between a Michigan nonprofit acute care hospital facility and Columbia/HCA violated the state's charitable purpose laws.92 The court
concluded that state law prohibited the transfer of charitable assets to a for-profit joint
venture.93 The second point at which cy pres comes into play is after the conversion:
must the proceeds from the conversion be put to the same charitable use as before?
83. CAL.HEALTH& SAFETY
CODE$5 1399.71(e)(I),1399.72(c)(West 1998).
84. NEB.REV. STAT.$8 71-20,103 to 71-20,113 (1996).
85. Richard C. Allen, The Massachusetts Experience, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 85; CAL.
HEALTH& SAFETY
CODE$ 1399.75(e).
86. See CAL.HEALTH & SAFETYCODE5

1399.75 (e) (West 1998); CAL.CORP.CODE5 5914 (West

1998).
87. Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, Georgia, Oklahoma and Rhode Island. See James F. Owens, Stares
Regulate Non-Profit Hospital Conversions,NAT'LL.J., Sept. 8, 1997, at Bl 0.
88. GEORGE
G. BOGERT& GEORGE
T. BOGERT,THELAWOF TRUSTS& TRUSTEESch. 22, $ 43 1, at 95
(2d rev. ed. 1991).
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 66 Cal. App.3d 359 (1977) (involving the lease of a nonprofit hospital's facilities, the profits of which were to be used to open additional medical clinics); Allen, supro note 85, at 87.
92. Kelley v. Michigan Afiliated Healthcare, No. 96-83848C2, 96 TNT 187-18 (Mich. Cir. Ct. for the
County of Ingharn Sept. 5, 1996).
93. This was not directly a cy pres issue, for the court did not rule directly on the cy pres point.
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Another issue that has arisen is whether the Internal Revenue Service should be involved in these conversions, examining the fiduciary responsibilities of nonprofit directors, which is traditionally a function of the states and state corporate law. The IRS historically has had a rear view mirror approach to regulation of such sales.94
VII. TROUBLE
SPOTS-PROBLEMS
AND CONVERSION
ISSUES
A. Conflicts of Interest

A fundamental problem with conversions is that directors of the nonprofit entity
may be involved with the for-profit company. They may be promised stock or already be
substantial shareholders of the for-profit venture. The acquiring corporation may offer
bonuses, salaries, or "golden parachutes"95 if the director joins the for-profit organization. There may be contingency compensation based upon the success of completing the
transaction. In its nonprofit guise, the fiduciary obligation of the director is to obtain the
highest value for the nonprofit and to assure that the community is provided with health
care. That individual's interests as a for-profit shareholder or a future employee may be
in opposition. This has been a particular problem in hospital and Blue Cross conversions
where executives of the nonprofit are promised substantial bonuses and long term compensation agreements. In Ohio, the management of Blue Cross of Ohio accepted an offer
~ ~ .executives
~~
were to receive $19 million in payouts as
to be sold to ~ o l u m b i a / HFour
part of the transaction, and seven former directors were to receive $3 million.97 Gener-

94. This has not been so with joint ventures between a nonprofit and a for-profit where the former is attempting to preserve its exempt status. In Revenue Ruling 98-15, the IRS tightened the ability of for-profit
hospitals to control joint venture arrangements with non profit hospitals. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B.
6; Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (1991); see also Plumstead Theatre Soc'y, Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980)
(holding that a nonprofit theatre company whose activities included the presentation of dramatic theatre productions, workshop for new American playwrights, and the establishment of a fund to assist new and established playwrights which entered into joint venture with investors who were to receive a percentage of profits
from production was entitled to tj 501(c)(3) status because commercial investors were limited partners without
control). Additionally, Internal Revenue oversight at the conversion stage raises federalism questions which
will be discussed later in this article.
95. That is, substantial termination payments.
96. The transaction was structured as follows: Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ohio (BCBSO) was to spin off
a wholly-owned for-profit subsidiary, Blue Co., and transfer substantially all of BCBSO's assets to it. A
wholly owned subsidiary of Columbia/HCA would purchase all of Blue Co.'s stock for $299.5 million. At the
time BCBSO had $233 million in reserves. If BCBSO failed to exercise its best efforts to transfer its rights to
the Blue Cross Blue Shield trademark to Blue Co., the purchase price would be reduced by $50 million. If
BCBSO accepted another acquisition proposal h m another suitor, it would be required to pay a stiff "good
bye fee" of $25 million, in addition to sending its subscribers to ColumbiaRiCA hospitals and paying Columbia/HCA's highest hospital service rates for a period of five years. See Craig R. Mayton, The Viewfrom Ohio,
HEALTHAm., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 94. One can only wonder about the quality of Blue Cross's lawyering in
signing such a one-sided agreement. Perhaps the answer is that the insider general counsel was scheduled to
receive $1.2 million for a 10-year agreement not to compete and $2.3 million for two consulting agreements.
See Diane Solov, Blue Cross' Top Executives to Get Millions in Buyour, THEPLAINDEALER,May 10, 1996, at
1A. Furthermore, Blue Cross's outside counsel was scheduled to receive $3.5 million for a five-year agreement not to compete. See id.
97. Bloomberg Bus. News, Columbia/HCA to Pay Blue Cross Oflcials, N.Y. TIMES,May 10, 1996, at
D6.The national Blue Cross Association revoked the chartered Ohio Blue Cross for this attempt and the Ohio
Dept. of Insurance rejected the transaction on March 12, 1997.See Mary Chris Jaklevic, Ohio Blues Gives Up:

Heinonline - - 23 J. Corp. L. 717 1997-1998

718

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Summer

ally, these conversions are "friendly" transactions as viewed by management. The governing body and key staff of the converting nonprofit usually work closely with the forprofit entity. This raises questions about the integrity of the organization's decisionmaking process as well as the quality of information provided by the staff to the board.
The charity may be operated during the period leading up to the transaction in a way that
potentially devalues the organization's business or assets in order to make the acquisition
more attractive to a potential future employer.98 The response of several jurisdictions has
. ~ ~ other
been to introduce legislation prohibiting bonuses as part of a t r a n ~ a c t i o n Most
jurisdictions have declined to do anything.
There should be enhanced scrutiny of conflicts of interest with respect to placement
of proceeds, whether into a new nonprofit entity or with a joint venture undertaken by a
nonprofit entity and a for-profit purchaser.lOO All transactions should be approved and
negotiated by an independent committee of disinterested outside directors. This may not
be possible in HMO situations, where boards of nonprofit HMOs have consisted largely
of insiders. The test then would be the intrinsic fairness of the transaction to the nonprofit
with the burden on the board of directors. All of these transactions should be subject to
review by the attorney general and by a court.

B. Valuation Issues
At the heart of the conversion controversy are difficult issues of valuation. How can
one attain a fair market value for the converting organization? Nonprofit entities present
greater valuation difficulties than for-profit f m s . Nonprofit valuation is more complex
and uncertain than the valuation of a comparably-sized for-profit.lOl
One factor is that there is no readily ascertainable market value. Another is that
nonprofit f m s are not regularly scrutinized by gaggles of securities analysts and investment advisors that follow for-profit counterparts. Valuation, then, rests upon the appraiser's craft, inherently a subjective process. The subjectivity of the valuation process
is overlaid by the very human and economically rational behavior that the appraiser may
use their discretion to serve the interests of those who hire them.Io2
Insurer Agrees to Call Off Columbia Deal, Remove CEO, MODERNHEALTHCARE,
Mar. 24, 1997, at 2.
98. See Allen, supra note 85, at 86.
99. Colorado has prohibited converting corporations from going public within three years of a conversion. Usually the former nonprofit managers would own substantial sums of stock as a form of bonus, which
would become enormously valuable on a public offering. See COLO. REV.STAT.ANN. 5 10-16-324 (West
1997).
100. See CAL.HEALTH& SAFETY
CODE$ 1399.71(e) (Supp. 1998) (prohibiting inurement and conflicts
of interest in joint ventures and their transactions by a nonprofit).
101. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, Nonprofit Conversion Transactions: Existing Fiduciary Duties and Necessav Reforms, in CONVERSION
TRANSACTIONS:
CHANGING
BETWEENNONPROFIT& FOR-PROFITFORM1
(1996) (stating that "nonprofit conversions suffer when compared to for-profit acquisitions because of. . . the
general difficulty of valuation in the nonprofit conversion context"); see also GAO, Not-jor-Profit Hospitals
Conversion Issues Prompt Increased State Oversight, 19 EXEMPTORG.TAX REV. 261, 264-66 (1998)
(describing valuation approaches).
102. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair are They and What Can Be
Done About It?, 1989 DUKEL.J.27, 37 (1989); Charles M. Elson, Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or
Should We Care, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 951,965 (1992); Tower, supra note 35, at 169; Elliott J. Weiss, The Low o j
Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4 CARDOZO
L. REV.245, 255 (1983). The
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Traditionally in health care transactions three different methods of valuation are
utilized: 1) replacement cost or asset valuation; 2) market comparison, which involves
setting the sale price in relation to comparable assets; and 3) the most widely used
method, discounted cash flow analysis, which establishes a price by projecting a health
provider's earnings potential.lo3 Valuation of nonprofit hospitals is generally calculated
as a multiple of a hospital's earnings before the expenses of interest, depreciation, taxes,
and amortization, known by the acronym, "EBIDTA." Appraisers generally have placed
the value of a nonprofit hospital at five to seven times EBIDTA, though valuations outside of this range are not uncommon.104 Valuation is severely tested in the health care
area where there has not been a market, and in which the conversion is followed thereafter by a substantial increase in value of a publicly-traded health care company in comparison to its nonprofit value.lo5
The subjectivity and difficulty of valuation may be demonstrated by the sale of St.
Vincent's Hospital in Worcester, Massachusetts, part of Fallon Healthcare System, to
OrNda, a large investor-owned hospital chain.lo6 The sale was for $4 million, though the
plant was worth substantially more. The hospital, burdened with debt, handed the keys
over with the promise that the for-profit would run the hospital and pay off long term
debt of $68 million. However, OrNda, which purchased the Fallon Clinic as well, paid
over $60 million to the 200 doctors and executives who ran Fallon Healthcare System of
which the hospital was but a part. The hospital had property and equipment valued at $72
million and working capital of $17 million. The community got $4 million, after the
Massachusetts Attorney General intervened and issued a glowing press release on the
conversion. The Attorney General's appraiser, Arthur Anderson Consulting, had concluded the hospital had a negative net value because of its heavy debt, and felt OrNda
overpaid for the hospital and clinic. Anderson compared St. Vincents to other hospitals
and treated it as worse off than any in a comparable group. If it had treated the hospital as
merely equal to the weakest in the sample, it would have been worth $20 million. If the
sample had been broadened, and Anderson had based its calculations on the weakest

subjectivity and willingness of investment bankers to issue fairness opinions that are favorable to the needs of
the retainer is demonstrated in Mills v. Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1272-73, 1281-82 (Del. 1989). On May 30,
1988, investment bankers informed management that a restructuring price of $64.15 was fair, and on June 7,
1988, investment bankers advised that the company had a maximum breakup value of $80 per share. On
August 25, 1988, in the context of a hostile tender offer after urgings by managemen& the same group of investment bankers issued a new opinion that $80 was unfair and inadequate. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v.
CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 257-58 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (involving an investment bank
which structured a poison pill defensive measure; when the tender offer commenced, the bank was hired to
determine fairness and would receive a bonus if hostile suitor lost proxy fight, and the bank wrote that the
opinion offer was unfair); Hanson Trust v. ML SCM Acquisition, 781 F.2d 264, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1986)
(dealing with an investment bank which structured and arranged financing in a lock up option, then declared it
was unfair).
103. See Tower, supra note 35, at 160.
104. See Robert A. Boisture & Albert G. Lauber, Full Text Comment Letters: Caplin & Drysdale Comments on Whole Hospital Joint Ventures, 16 EXEMPTORG.
TAXREV. 650,652-53 (1997).
105. See Goldschmid, supra note 101, at 2-3.
106. See Gerard O'Neill et al., Projit Motives Doom Worcester Hospital, BOS. GLOBE,Nov. 17, 1996, at
Al.
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hospital from a larger sample, it would have been worth $40 million. An independent real
estate valuation firm hired by the Boston Globe came up with a value of $38 million.lo7
The problem of determining value is that a hospital may have a different value as a
nonprofit, a for-profit, a for-profit taken over by a chain, or a hospital that will be the
first in an area to convert. The hospital's value may also be relative to the competition in
the area, as well as to other market specific factors. Hospital valuations encompass a variety of industry specific factors including scope of services, market share and ease of
entry of competition, payor mix, Medicare gainfloss recapturelo8 and patient mix.lo9 The
difficulties of valuation may ease dramatically as a result of the growing number of acquisitions. Future earnings capacity, as estimated by capitalized earnings approaches and
discounted cash flow analyses, will make determination of fair market value similar to
the determination of value through an initial public offering of a close corporation.
Other factors may assist conversion sales at fair market value. Increased state regulation and legislation may also assure conversions at a fair market value.l1° Some have
recommended that legislation require a market test.ll l In other words, any hospital,
HMO, or Blue Cross that is up for sale or conversion would be required to offer itself to
other bidders beyond the initial offeror once the nonprofit board has reached a decision
to sell or convert. The requirement of a market test would entail public disclosure of the
proposed transaction, the release of relevant information (subject to appropriate confidentiality safeguards) to responsible persons, an adequate time period for competing offers to be made, and prohibitions on lock ups and other devices which would taint the
test.112
Is there an absolute duty to maximize financial return? Under Delaware law, once it
appears a corporation will be sold, the duty of the board of directors is to maximize "the
company's value at a sale for the stockholder's benefit."l13 In the nonprofit context the

107. See id.
108. Under Medicare regulations, a Medicare provider is entitled to reimbursement for the indirect cost of
using tangible assets through an allowance for depreciation. See 42 C.F.R. 4 413.134 (1998). Upon disposal of
the asset, the regulations provide for adjustment of the allowable cost determination. If a conversion or disposal results in a gain, such as the sale price exceeding the book value of the asset, the government may recoup depreciation expenses paid to the provider. The adjustment for a gain is limited to the actual amount of
depreciation previously allowed as Medicare allowable costs. See 42 C.F.R 5 413.134(0. Conversely, if the
sale price is less than the depreciated book value of the asset, the provider is entitled to reimbursement for
Medicare's proportionate share of the loss. The amount of an adjustment allowed for a loss is limited to the
undepreciated basis of the asset permitted under the program. See id.; see olso St. Mark's Charities v. Shalala,
952 F. Supp. 1488, 1490 (D. Utah 1997) (discussing 42 C.F.R. 4 413-134(f)(1998)).
109. See Tower, supro note 35, at 161-62.
110. See NEB.REV. STAT.
5 71-20,108(5) (1996) (listing factors for evaluating whether "appropriate steps
have been taken to safeguard the value of charitable assets").
111. See Goldschmid, supro note 101, at 13-14.
112. A lock-up is a generic name for a variety of techniques used in a tender offer to assure that a particular bidder will be successful and to thwart competitive bidding. Sometimes stock is issued to the favored
bidder, making the acquisition more expensive for other offerors. Other devices include an agreement to reimJ.
burse the favored bidder's fees and the sale of prized assets of the target to the favored bidder. See RONALD
GILSON& BERNARDS. BLACK,THELAWAND FINANCEOF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS1020-1023 (2d ed.
1995).Lock-ups are not illegal per se under Delaware law, the most important jurisdiction for corporate law.
See Revlon v. McAndrews & Forbes Holding, 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1986).
113. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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board's responsibilities should be to maximize the return to the public, including benefits
to the community. This does not necessarily mean that the board must accept the highest
price. Whether or not to recommend acceptance of a particular bidder is within the business judgment of the board. It may be that the highest bid will not be the best for the organization as a deliverer of healthcare. Or, its financial situation may be precarious. For
instance, in the Family Health Plan conversion described earlier,l14 Maxicare Health
Plans made a competing offer at a substantially higher price and sued to prevent HMO
Health Group's conversion of FHP.~
I S The court held that the law did not require a sale
to the highest bidder.l l6

C. Lack o/Disclosure
Whenever possible, the principals to conversions attempt to impose a veil of secrecy
over the transaction. At the beginning of negotiations between the for-profit acquirer and
the nonprofit, a confidentiality agreement is signed. l l7 Some conversion transactions
have been completed in secret without community knowledge. Should the community
have the right to know the terms of the venture?
Should there be community input into the terms of the transaction? There is nothing
similar to the disclosure mandates of American securities regulation.'18 The participants
in the transaction argue that the terms are proprietary information and fear that disclosure
could jeopardize the transaction. In Massachusetts, the attorney general agreed with the
parties in the Fallon Healthcare-OrNda conversion that the underlying financial documents that justify prices paid are trade secrets that are nobody else's business.l l9 During
the attempted sale of Blue Cross of Ohio, state regulators, though promising to keep the

114. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
115. See Maxicare Health Plans v. Gumbiner, No. C-565072 (Los Angeles Superior Ct. 1986). One year
after the conversion Maxicare went into bankruptcy.
116. See Id.
117. The difficulty of finding out details about these transactions is illustrated by the testimony of Linda
B. Miller, President of the Volunteer Trustees Foundation:
Confidentiality agreements are signed early in the negotiation-and the community never
knows what the deal looks like. It never knows what the hospital considered by way of other
offers, how the asset was valued, what the for-profit buyer actually paid out and what it
got in return, what portion of the proceeds were re-deployed to a charitable foundation or
under what terms. Everything is secret. (Three years after Nashville Memorial in TN was
sold, the incorporators of the hospital are still in court trying to find out what the hospital was
sold for!)
Goldschmid supra note 101, at 3 (quoting Miller's statement before the Committee on Health and Human Resources of the Nebraska State Legislature on February 1, 1996).
118. Generally, the Securities and Exchange Commission regulates public corporations, which means
corporations with at least 500 shareholders and approximately $10 million in assets. See Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 5 12(g), 15 U.S.C. 5 781(g) (1997). Rule 12g-1 exempts from registration companies with assets
of less than $10 million. 17 C.F.R. 5 240.12g-1 (1997).There are an estimated 14,000 such corporations in the
United States.
119. See O'NEILL
et al., supra note 106. In California, according to a researcher with whom the author
spoke, the Blue Cross of California Document file concerning the most contentious conversion has been almost completely redacted by the Commissioner of Corporation's Office, making scholarly inquiry difficult if
not impossible. Telephone interview with Teresa McMahon (September 1996).
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public informed, privately attempted to keep the facts of the transaction secret during the
review process and released no information including facts about the $3.9 million paid to
board members. 120 The Ohio Supreme Court found that insurance regulators abused their
discretion in keeping this information secret.121 Recent conversion legislation by states
requires that the plan for conversion be available to the public and often sets forth what
information must be made a ~ a i 1 a b l e . l ~ ~
Another important issue is what information should be part of the public record.
Though some states now require or have held public hearings,123the legislation does not
specify what role the public is supposed to play or which public is to be involved. The
state attorney general formally represents the public interest. Is the hearing mere window
dressing, allowing anyone to vent their anger or views or is it to have a genuine role in
the conversion process? Patricia A. Butler has pointed out that there are likely to be many
publics with different agendas: insurance plan policyholders, persons sewed by different
activities of the converting hospital, the medical staff, potential beneficiaries of a foundation, and the "community."'24 These diverse views are more likely to be heard
through a public hearing. A second purpose of the public hearing confirms Justice Brandeis's observation that "[slunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants, electric light the
most efficient policeman."125 The conflicts of interest that many of these transactions
contain are brought to the surface and often cannot survive the outrage of the public, encouraging a stricter scrutiny by r e g ~ 1 a t o r s . l ~ ~
The public hearing also allows policyholders, public policy experts, and advocacy
groups to shape the final transaction, assuring that the public's interest will be protected.
The public process has brought out public interest groups such as Consumers Union,
which led the fight against the California Blue Cross conversion.127The public process
does create problems in closing the transaction that are often muted or absent in typical
business transactions where timing is more important than process. When the terms are
made public, the emphasis on process comes to the fore, and the time frame of the trans-

120. See Mark Tatge & Diane Solov, Insurance Watchdog Fought for Secrecy, PLAINDEALER,Dec. 21,

1997, at 1G.
121. See Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dept. of Ins., 687 N.E.2d 661, 667 (Ohio 1997) (stating that documents
relating to the proposed acquisition of Blue Cross are not exempt from disclosure under the "work papers"
exception to the Public Records Act); see also Tatge, supra note 120, at IG. Among the more sought-after
documents regulators kept secret were the details of the payout to the Blue Cross trustees. However, Blue
Cross insisted that the board voted on their retirement largess before they approved the sale to Columbia
HCA, thereby creating no conflict of interest. In fact, the board meeting approving the retirement benefits
came three months after a board meeting authorizing the Chairman to sell Blue Cross to either Columbia or
another company. In the aftermath of the collapse of the deal, six of the former trustees agreed to return $2.4
million after they were sued. A seventh donated his retirement benefit to charity. See id.
122. See COLO. REV. STAT.5 10-16-324(3)(1997); OHIO REV.CODEANN. 5 109.34@)(Banks-Baldwin

1997).
123. See CAL.HEALTH& SAFETY CODE8 1399.74 (West 1997); CAL.CORP.CODE5 5916 (West 1997).
124. Patricia A. Butler, Stale Policy Issues in Nonprofit Conversions, HEALTHAFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at

69,77.
125. LOUS D.BRANDEIS,OTHER PEOPLE'SMONEYAND HOW THE BANKERS
USE IT 92 (1914).
126. The merits of the conversion of the Ohio Blue Cross seemed lost in the millions the senior management was to receive from the transaction.
127. See Eleanor Hamburger, et al., The Pot of Gold: Monitoring Health Care Conversions Can Yield
REV.473,479-489(1995).
Billions of Dollarsfor Healthcare, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE
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action may be so lengthened and s c r u t i n i z e d that a p p r o p r i a t e conversions as w e l l as
q u e s t i o n a b l e ones may not come t o fruition. Recent state efforts to oversee conversions
require parties to a c o n v e r s i o n to d i s c l o s e to the regulator a l l terms of the transaction and
a l l conflicts of interest.128
California requires nonprofit o r g a n i z a t i o n s to notify the C o m m i s s i o n e r of Corporat i o n s and the Attorney G e n e r a l in advance of a plan to convert,129who must then hold at
least one p u b l i c hearing in the hospital's county, and p r o v i d e a sixty-day p e r i o d w i t h one
forty-five day extension to review the transaction.130Nebraska r e q u i r e s a t least thirty
days notification of an impending acquisition.l3l If the attorney g e n e r a l or state regulator
does not have sufficient notice of the transaction, the terms between the parties will be
c o m p l e t e l y negotiated and s i g n e d in a contract, making the transaction more difficult to
~nwind.l3~

Apart from the issue of the p u b l i c hearing i s the question whether state officials
s h o u l d have an informal review process to explore whether the proposed transaction is a
conversion and whether certain aspects are controversial or impermissible.133 The problem of informal advance r e v i e w i s that it may make the p u b l i c hearings a charade. However, informal or advance scrutiny is regularly used by federal agencies in the antitrust
field in the form of "business r e v i e w letters;"134 in federal income tax through private
letter rulings;l35 and in securities regulation through "no action" letters.136

128. See NEB. REV. STAT.5 71-20,108(4) (1996); CAL.HEALTH& SAFETYCODE5 1399.71(e)(2)(D).
129. See CAL.HEALTH& SAFETYCODE5 1399.71(a); CAL. COW. CODE5 5914 (West 1997). See also
NEB.REV. ST. 71-20,104 (1996).
130. See CAL.COW. CODE5 5915; see also NEB. REV. STAT.$5 71-20,107,20,106.
13 1. See NEB. REV. STAT.Q 71-20,107; see also OHIOREV. CODEANN. 5 109.35 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
132. See Butler, supra note 124, at 76.
133. See id.
134. The leading treatise on anti-trust law states that:
Although the Justice Department lacks the power to immunize transactions generally from the
antitrust laws, it may "approve" a transaction by stating in a "business review letter" that on
the basis of its present information it "has no present intention to challenge" the proposed action. Such a clearance cannot bind a court, a private plaintiff, or the Federal Trade Commission,
although a court might choose to give it weight in the same way that it can consider enforcement guidelines. Nor would the Justice Department feel inhibited ffom seeking the usual remedies if the party requesting the clearance had submitted the inaccurate or incomplete information.
I1 Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 5 331c, at 100-01 (rev. ed. 1995)
135. A private letter ruling is a written statement issued to the taxpayer upon request, usually in advance
of a proposed transaction in which the staff of the IRS interprets the tax laws to the specific set of facts presented. The private letter ruling advises the taxpayer of the treatment she can expect from the situation in the
fact pattern. Private letter rulings are directed only to the organization or individual requesting it and cannot
be used or cited as precedent. See 1.R.C. 5 61 10(j)(3) (1997).
136. Under SEC procedure, in certain circumstances an informal statement of the views of the Commission may be obtained. See 17 C.F.R. 5 202.l(d) (1997). Typically, a "no action" letter reaffirms the informal
advice provided by the staff to a company that is attempting to determine what properly may be omitted from
its proxy materials. The letter does not bind the SEC to a particular course of action. See Roosevelt v. E.1.
DuPont de Nemours, 958 F.2d 416,427 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that the letter does not amount to adjudication or rulemaking).
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A criticism is that state regulators may not obtain the necessary information in a
timely fashion and in any case, may lack the capacity to analyze it.137Another proposal,
recommending the establishment of an SEC-type governmental body or a Charities
Commission on the English model, was fust mentioned over 35 years ago.138 However,
the American political ethos has moved away from establishing new governmental agencies. Yet another suggestion has been a mandatory disclosure system with collaboration
At best, any such collaboration would be many years
among state charity reg~lators.l3~
away, long after the conversion wave will have run its course.

D. Financing
Originally, sales of nonprofit hospitals to investor-owned chains were paid in cash.
Today, most are asset sales, and the use of stock is the dominant financing model. Often
the transaction is structured as a joint venture in which only a portion of the asset value is
paid at the time of conversion, and the charitable organization becomes a partner of the
for-profit. The for-profit actually runs the hospital and shares profits.
HMOs have used a variety of sophisticated financing techniques involving various
kinds of securities. In some cases, the terms of sale require as little as 50% of asset value
to be paid on the closing date. The balance is paid with shares of stock in the new forprofit venture, which may place the charity at risk of economic losses. Recent indications
are that conversions are facing growing resistance. Acquirers like ColumbialHCA, for
instance, have come upon hard times.140 Its stock has declined over fifty percent in
1997.l4I There are significant financial implications for these new foundations and organizations that have received large amounts of stock as part of the consideration in the
transaction. If the purchasing entity's stock collapses or there is a general market turndown, the value of conversion-created foundations will substantially decline along with
the amount these organizations will spend for the public good.

137. See Goldschmid, supra note 101, at 12.
138. See Kenneth Karst, The Eflciency of the Charitable Dollar: An UntlJilledState Responsibility, 73
HARV.L. REV. 433,476-83 (1960) (discussing a proposal for a government agency to supervise and administer the system).
139. See Goldschmid, supra note 101, at 11-12.
140. The California attorney general objected to a joint venture between Columbia and Sharp Healthcare
and threatened to hold nonprofit directors personally liable for undervaluing the chain by $100-200 million.
The deal later unwound due to the objection. See Milt Freudenheim, California Challenges Deal on Nonprofit
Hospital, N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 9, 1996, at 35; see also Anita Sharp & Rhonda L. Rundle, Columbio/HCAf
California Expansion Falters as Sharp Healthcare Pact Foils, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 24, 1997, at B8. An effort in
Ohio to acquire Blue Cross was thwarted. For a description of some of the controversy facing Columbia, see
Martin Gottlieb & Kurt Eichenwald, Health Care f Giant- When Hospitals Play Hardball, N.Y. TIMES,May
11, 1997, 5 3, at 1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and several government agencies were examining
some of the recent acquisitions and business practices of ColumbiaRICA. See Kurt Eichenwald, FBI Reported
Examining Hospital Operation in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES,April 1, 1997, at D2; Kurt Eichenwald, Columbia/HCA
is Said to Settle Tar Casefor $71 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at D4.
14 1. The Valueline Investment Survey estimated in January of 1998 that "investors should look elsewhere
for now." Markey, supra note 50, at 653.
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E. How Much ofthe Organization's Value Should Remain in the Public Domain?
What is a theoretical rationale for requiring assets to be set aside when there is a
conversion? Jurisdictions differ over the theory of the benefits of tax exemption and over
whether any assets must remain in the charitable stream. Should the amount of assets devoted to public use be based on a tax benefit theory by which the set aside would be limited to the value of tax benefits received by the organization plus interest, or should the
traditional charitable trust theory (which would require that the value of all assets of the
exempt organization be set aside) be applied? The differences in amount depending on
the method of valuation could be enormous.
When Blue Crosses have converted, typically they have used the drop-down app r 0 a ~ h . Thus,
l ~ ~ the insurance company becomes a for-profit subsidiary of the nonprofit
parent. This technique was used in California when Blue Cross of California, the state's
largest health insurer, created a for-profit subsidiary, Wellpoint Health Networks, and
transferred to it a 423,000-member HMO, its 1.5 million-member preferred provider
network, and the company's pharmacy, dental, mental health, senior, and workers' compensation programs. Blue Cross retained 82% of Wellpoint and sold the remainder for
$5 17 million. At first, Blue Cross argued that because it did not convert itself to for-profit
status, but only created a for-profit subsidiary, it owed nothing to the public. Although
Blue Cross's argument was correct from a legal standpoint, it did not pass the "smell
test," which led to a public outcry. Eventually, the Wellpoint subsidiary was sold to another HMO, creating two private foundations-the California Healthcare Foundation,
with $2.2 billion in stock, and the California Endowment, with over $1 million in
cash. 143
This dispute has been played out in other jurisdictions with mixed results. In some
jurisdictions, Blue Cross has attempted to shape state laws to make conversion easier and
cheaper by eliminating the nonprofit Blue's responsibility to keep assets in the charitable
stream.144In other states, legislation has attempted to preserve the charitable assets upon
conversion.145 Courts in Missouri and Georgia concluded that their state's Blues owed
nothing to the public because they had lost their charitable e ~ e m ~ t i 0 nA. lback-up
~~
argument in some jurisdictions has been that Blue Cross should return public monies that
were received because of the tax exemption. For example, the set aside of monies to the
public is limited to the tax benefit received by the organization plus interest. In Virginia,
the legislature used the assets from the Blue Cross conversion for education funds, relieving the state's taxpayers and providing a refund to subscribers.147

142. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
143. See Fishman & Schwartz, supra note 34 at 105-106.
144. See N.J.REV. STAT.
$5 17:48E, :48E-45, :48E-17 (1997).
145. See COLO. REV. STAT.
5 10-16-324 (1997); ME. REV.STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, 5 194-A (West 1997).
146. The Georgia court said that Blue Cross was not charitable because the company had been taxed since
1960. In Missouri, a court granted summary judgment to Blue Cross, stating it owed nothing to the state. See
Blue Cross Missouri Gains in Legal Fight with State Oficials, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1996, at B2. Blue
Crosses lost their federal tax exemptions in 1986. See I.RC. 5 501(m) (1986).
147. See Butler, supra note 124, at 72; see also David Ress, Trigon Conversion Approved, RICHMOND
TIMESDISPATCH,
Oct. 29, 1996, at C-1.
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F. Who Should Regulate These Conversions-The Role of the Attorney General
Historically, the attorney general in most states has had the responsibility of supervision and oversight of charitable trusts and corporations. He may maintain such actions
as appropriate to protect the public interest.148Most jurisdictions, but not all, require attorneys general to receive advance notice of organic changes such as conversions.149The
Volunteer Trustees Foundation for Research and Education, which has studied health
care conversions, has recommended that the attorney general be primarily responsible
for: 1) safeguarding the value of charitable assets; 2) safeguarding the community from
loss of essential health services; and 3) assuring that proceeds of the transaction are used
for appropriate charitable purposes. l
The problem is that attorneys general have neither the resources nor the expertise to
closely monitor these conversions. Health care providers may be supervised by other
state agencies who certify, regulate, and oversee health providers, but the conversion
phenomenon is potentially broader than the health care sector. For all practical purposes,
charities are self-regulated.151 Only thirteen states have charities sections within attorneys general 0 f f i ~ e s . Additionally,
l~~
there is limited standing for others to sue. Nonprofits have no shareholders, and few charities have members. Generally, the public has
no standing.
What is needed is an increase in the leverage of state attorneys general. Giving attorneys general explicit legislative authority over conversions neither adds to their budgets nor the size of their offices. One way to leverage inadequate staffing is to use the
common law concept of the relator to challenge the terms of proposed transactions. A
relator is a party who may or may not have a direct interest in a transaction, but who is
permitted to institute a proceeding in the name of the state when that right to sue resides

148. See REV. MODELNONPROFIT~ORP.
ACT 55 1.70,3.04, 8.10, 14.03-14.04 (1988); CAL.COW. CODE
$5 5142,5250,651 1,9230 (West 1990);N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
COW. L. 5 112 (McKinney 1997).
149. See CAL.COW. CODE5 5913; OHIOREV.CODEANN. 5 109.34(B)(Anderson 1997).
150. See Robert A. Boisture & Douglas N. Varley, Stafe Attorneys General's Legal Authority to Police
the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals and HMOs, in Selling Off the Nation's Not-for-Profit Hospitals: The Legal
Basis for Oversight Tab 2, 16 (Sept. 19, 1995) (unpublished presentation) (on file with author).
151. See Robert Abrams, Regulating Chariv-The State's Role, 35 REC. 481, 484 (1980); see also
MARIONFREMONT-SMITH,
FOUNDATIONS
AND GOVERNMENT 226-228 (1965).
152. See PETERSWORDS& HARRIETBOGRAD,NONPROFITACCOUNTABILITY
(visited Apr. 2, 1998)
<http://www.bway.net/-hbogradtcyb-acc.ht1.These states are home to 55% of the United States' charities
and have 65% of national charitable revenues. Except for New Hampshire and New Jersey, all have more than
two full-time attorneys. "Integrated" state attorney general offices generally provide registration and reporting
systems for charities and for professional fundraisers; an enforcement program that includes inquiries, investigations, negotiations, and litigation to protect charitable assets and prevent fundraising abuse; educational
programs to promote more responsible board governance andlor to prevent fundraising fraud; and oversight of
charitable trusts or bequests. Some, but not all, of these offices also oversee certain structural changes such as
mergers, dissolutions, or major transfers of assets. Many of these offices have self-sustaining budgets, supported by fairly modest registration and reporting fees. The second most common pattern is for one state
agency to handle charitable registration and reporting, while the attorney general's office handles enforcement. The agency responsible for overseeing charitable solicitations may be the secretary of state, the consumer protection agency, or an agency that deals with registration and licensing. In ten states, there is no general system of registration and reporting for charities. Of these, Texas still has an actively staffed charities
office within the state anomey general's office, and Iowa has an active program of prosecuting solicitation
fraud. See id.

Heinonline - - 23 J. Corp. L. 726 1997-1998

19981

Checkpoints on the Conversion Highway

727

solely in the attorney generaL153 Thus, to expand the resources of the attorney general,
an action would be brought by a private party, such as a public interest law firm, on behalf of the public interest or the state. The attorney general still would exercise ultimate
control over the litigation. In order to recover litigation expenses incurred by the private
party, such as attorneys' fees, legislation needs to be enacted.

G. The Internal Revenue Service's Role
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may become interested if the transaction violates the private inurement or private benefit proscriptions of the Code. The conversion
process may provide directors, officers or employees with private inurement through
transactions that improperly benefit management, such as golden parachutes, or undervalue the nonprofit entity when it is sold to a for-profit successor whose owners include
managers of the n0npr0fit.l~~
Section 501(c)(3) organizations are prohibited from engaging in activities that result
in "inurement" of the organization's net earnings to insiders, such as founders, directors,
and officers.155 Related to the private inurement proscription is the "private benefit"
doctrine that prohibits a section 501(c)(3) organization from providing a substantial economic benefit to individuals, such as employees, who do not exercise any formal control
over the organization.lS6Thus, the inurement limitation applies only to an organization's
insiders whose special relationship to the organization affords them an opportunity to
benefit economically from the organization's income or assets.157 The private benefit
doctrine is founded on the principle that a charity must serve public rather than private
interests. The private benefit prohibition applies to anyone outside of the intended charitable class, whether or not they are insiders. As interpreted by the IRS, a private benefit
must be more than incidental, in contrast to the absolute ban on private inurement.lS8
Until recently, even if the private inurement or private benefit proscriptions occurred in a conversion context, the only remedy was to revoke the exemption of the hospital. Although this remedy would penalize holders of tax exempt paper and change the
financial valuation of the hospital, it would result in very little damage if the hospital was
converting to for-profit status. Revocation of exemption for an isolated instance of inurement even on a transaction as qualitatively and quantitatively significant as a conversion was vastly disproportionate to the offense. In 1996, Congress passed intermediate
sanctions legislation to impose excise tax sanctions short of revocation when excessive

153. See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and An Agenda for Reform,
34 EMORYL.J. 617,671-674 (1985).
154. See Singer, supra note 5 I, at 246.
155. Treas. Reg. 1.501(a)-1 (1997) specifies that an organization is not operated exclusively for one or
more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals. The regulators define "private shareholder or individual" as any person "having a personal and
private interest in the activities of the organization." Treas. Reg. 5 1.501(a)-l(c) (as amended in 1982).
156. See Treas. Reg. 5 1.501(~)(3)-l(d)(l).
157. But see United Cancer Council v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 326 (1997), where the inurement limitation was
extended beyond the organization's insiders.
158. For the distinction in the context of joint ventures between tax exempt hospitals and private physicians, see Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 1991).
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economic benefits were provided to insiders-such as officers, directors, or employees of
c o n v e r t i n g nonprofits. lS9
The sanction, which is intermediate in the sense of being lesser than revocation, imposes an excise tax i f there is an excess b e n e f i t t r a n s a ~ t i o n 'between
~~
the exempt organization and a disqualified person.161The initial penalty is 25% of the "excess benefit" imposed on the disqualified person.162 Penalties may also be imposed on one or
more of the organization's managers.163 It is likely that some of the more egregious
payments, bonuses, options and rewards could be recaptured under the intermediate
sanctions legislation.

Thus, the Intemal Revenue Service has the authority to prevent private inurement so
as to ensure an adequate purchase price. Even prior to the a d d i t i o n of section 4958, the
IRS had indicated its concern w i t h conflicts of interest in the h e a l t h care area.164 It does
not, however, have the authority to require advance approval except for joint ventures
between for-profit and n o n p r o f i t organizations. The Service has indicated it will pay
closer attention to mergers between for-profit and nonprofit health care organizations in
the 1998 fiscal year.165Even if it desires to take a more active role, the IRS is faced with
decreasing
The Exempt Organizations Division s u p e r v i s e s 1.2 million nonprofits w i t h only 400 agents and a budget of $62 m i 1 l i 0 n . l ~T~h i s works out to six agents
for every 3,000 nonprofit ~ r g a n i z a t i o n s . ~ ~ ~

159. See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452, 1475-79 (1996) (adding section
4958 to the Internal Revenue Code).
160. An "excess benefit transaction" is any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided directly
by the organization or indirectly by a controlled entity, such as a taxable subsidiary to a disqualified person if
the value of the economic benefit exceeds the value of the consideration received by the organization for providing the benefit. See I.R.C. § 4958(c)(l) (1997).
161. A disqualified person is any person who, at any time during the five-year period preceding the excess
benefit transaction was "in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization."
I.R.C. 5 4958(f)(l)(A).
162. See I.R.C. 4958(a)(l).
163. See I.R.C. 8 4958(a)(2). Additional second tier penalties up to 200% of the excess benefit can be
imposed on the disqualified person if the violation is not corrected within a specified period of time. See
I.R.C. 4958(b).
164. See Charles F. Kaiser & T.J. Sullivan, Integrated Delivery Systems and Health Care Update, in
EXEMPTORGANIZATIONS
384, 396 (Intemal Revenue Service Continuing Professional Education Technical
Instruction Program 1996).
165. See Fred Stokeld, Health Care Mergers to Get More Attention from IRS, Says Owens, 18 EXEMPT
ORG.TAXREV. 195 (1997).
166. In 1997, Congress cut the agency's budget 10.5%, or nearly $774 million from the 1996 fiscal year's
level of funding. See Christopher Georges, House Approves Deep Cutbacks in IRS Funds, WALLST. J., July
18, 1996, at A14.
167. IRS Exempt Organization officials devote about 30% of their resources to the largest nonprofits,
principally hospitals and universities. The IRS's primary functions are to: (1) collect taxes; (2) manage applications for tax exempt status and the annual report; (3) provide a Form 990 reporting system; (4) audit; (5)
investigate; and (6) enforce. See SWORDS& BOGRAD,supra note 152. Less than one-half of one percent of
exempt organizations are examined each year, and the number of examinations fell from 7,541 in 1989 to
5,472 in 1993. House Ways & Means Comm., Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee Report on Reforms
to Improve the Tax Rules Governing Public Charities, 94 TNT 89-7, 111 (May 5, 1994).
168. In contrast, the Securities and Exchange Commission supervises approximately nine to fourteen
supra note 152.
thousand corporations with a substantially larger budget. See SWORDS & BOGRAD,
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It may be that the greatest impact of the intermediate sanctions legislation will be to
encourage the creation of a procedural paper trail as a bulwark against a violation of section 4958. The House Report and the proposed regulations state that the parties to a
transaction are entitled to rely on a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness with respect
to a compensation arrangement with a disqualified person if such arrangement was approved by a disinterested board, who obtained and relied upon appropriate data of comparable arrangements and adequately documented the basis for its dete1minati0n.l~~
Thus, the game for counsel of nonprofit employees who may benefit from conversion
l ~in ~
transactions will be to follow procedures to shift the burden of proof to the 1 ~ s .All
all, oversight principally will remain on the state level.

H. The New Foundations
It has been noted that when a nonprofit converts, the purchase money must remain
in the charitable strearn.l7l There have been several approaches to handling the consideration generated by these transactions. One has been to create a new private foundation;
another to create or affiliate with a public charity; a third, to distribute assets to other tax
exempt charities; and fourth, to place the resulting assets in the state treasury. The first
approach has been most common, as several enormous foundations have been formed by
the conversion of nonprofit health care institutions.
Approximately ninety foundations in all have been formed since 1990 through conversions, though it is difficult to obtain accurate f i g u r e ~ . These
' ~ ~ foundations represent
the "pay back" in the words of one foundation executive on a community's years of investment in a health care f a ~ i 1 i t y . Some
l ~ ~ of the new foundations are immense, such as
the two foundations created from the conversion of California Blue Cross demonstrate.
The California Wellness Foundation, formed in 1992 from the conversion of the HMO
Health Net, has assets of $1.2 bi11ion.l~~
The Rose Foundation, formed in the aftermath
of the sale of Rose Hospital in Denver, has assets of $185 rni11ion.l~~
In Dickson, Tennessee, a very small city, the foundation created from a local hospital conversion has assets of $80 mi11ion.l~~
Foundations are required to spend five percent of their endowment
annually on direct support or grants.177Although a foundation with $50 million in assets
sounds enormous, its annual charitable spending may be less than $2.5 million. These
169. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, at 56-57 (1996). Prop. Treas. Reg. 53.4958-6.
170. In the for-profit arena of takeovers, the major impact of the seminal case of Smith v. VanGorkom,488
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), has been to create procedural steps which boards follow to meet the demands of the
duty of care.
17 1. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
172. See Meyer, supra note 1; see also Domenica Marchetti, Redefining Health Philanthrom, CHRON.
OF
PHILANTHROPY,
July 24, 1997, at 1, 12 (recognizing 79 foundations and stating that others are being formed).
173. Craig Havighurst, Solid Foundations, HEALTHSYS.REV.,July-Aug. 1996, at 33-37.
174. See Harris Meyer, From Giving Care to Giving Grants, 37 FDN. NEWS & COMMENTARY NO. 4, 40
(JulyIAug. 1996).
175. See Domencia Marchetti, Redefining Health Philanthropy, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY,
July 24, 1997, at

1.
176. See Tamar Lewin & Martin Gottlieb, Health Care Dividend, N.Y. TIMES,Apr. 27, 1997, 5 1, at 1;
Greg Jaffe & Monica Langley, Generous to a Fault? Fledging Charities Get Billionsfrom the Sales ojNonprojr Hospitals, WALLST.J., Nov. 6, 1996, at A l .
177. See IRC 5 4942(e) (1997).The five percent figure includes administrative expenses.
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new health care foundations, despite their seemingly enormous size, will not solve the
problems of providing adequate health care to the poor, financing a cure for cancer, or
making up for government cutbacks.178
Several problems have arisen. The formation of the foundation comes well after the
deal has been finalized-almost as an afterthought. The community or public is not involved at any earlier point. After the formation, there has been little focus on what foundations are actually
Derek Bok, the former president of Harvard, has recently
written, "Of all the institutions in America, philanthropic foundations are surely among
States do not really monitor much after the foundation has
the least a~countable.''l~~
been formed.lS1 They seem to assume the IRS is doing so. However, as discussed above,
that is unlikely given the scope of the Service's brief and its lack of resources in the exempt organization area.
Many of the new foundations have no experience in philanthropic activity. There
has been no rush to turn the assets over to existing community foundations, which would
reduce administrative costs and provide
A very real problem for philanthropy is spending such large sums of money effectively. Many of the new foundations
are run by the former trustees of the originating HMO or hospital. These individuals
hardly have the independence one would wish, which may be more important than philanthropic experience. Basically, foundations only have to answer to their trustees. The
majority of boards are not composed of a cross-section of the community.183The philanthropic records of some of these new foundations give pause:
-The public benefit program run by Blue Cross of California exclusively funneled
subsidies for covering uninsured children to its affiliated ~ ~ 0 . l ~ ~
-When Colorado Trust was first established as the result of the sale of Denver's
PresbyterianISt. Luke's Medical Center in 1985, the trust's board, made up of doctors
and officials from the hospital, heavily steered funding to the h 0 s ~ i t a 1 . l ~ ~
-St. Luke's Charitable Health Trust in Phoenix, formed from the sale of a hospital,
started out by funding charity care to that hospital after it was ~ 0 n v e r t e d . l ~ ~

-

-

178. See Michele Bitoun Blecher, Show Us the Money, HEALTH& HOSP.NETWORKS,
June 20, 1997, at
52, available in LEXIS, Health Library, HOSP File (stating that "the needs of the uninsured represent a black
hole that new foundations simply cannot fill"); see also Meyer, supra note 1, at 30.
179. See Harris Meyer, From Giving Care to Giving Grants, FOUNDATION
NEWS & COMMENTARY,
JulyAug. 1996, at 40.
180. Derek Bok, Mute Inglorious Wizarh, N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 17, 1996, 8 7, at 42.
181. One exception is California. See infra notes 189-194 and accompanying text.
182. See Nancy M. Kane, Some Guidelinesfor Managing Charitable Assetsfrom Conversions, HEALTH
AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 229. In the earliest HMO conversions in California the charitable proceeds were used
to underwrite government programs, particularly Medical, California's Medicaid program. Id.
183. Massachusetts has been in the forefront of regulating both the conversions and the creation of foundations. The attorney general has taken a supervisory role in the establishment of the foundations and has
backed community groups who have demanded a role in board formation and goals development.
184. See Rhonda L. Rundle, Philanthropy: Big Charities Born as Health Plans Go For-Profit, WALLST.
J., Apr. 4, 1995, at B 1.
185. See Meyer, supra note 179.
186. See Meyer, supra note 179, at 43 (commenting on the performance of some foundations, which has
exacerbated worries about the independence of new charities and potential favoritism in their grant making).
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I. Cy Pres Issues Relating to the New Foundations

Do the new foundations have continuing responsibilities for health care or can they
broaden their mission to anything?lg7 Under traditional cy pres analysis, if there was a
hospital conversion, the assets would have to be used for the delivery of primary health
care as provided by a hospital. This may include health care for the poor.188
New York has a more liberal approach to cy pres as applied to a nonprofit corporation than does charitable trust law. It allows for distribution to organizations engaged in
substantially similar activities and leaves it to the board of directors to determine to
whom the distribution should be made. This means that assets given upon dissolution to
an organization need only be contributed to an entity that has "substantially similar act i ~ i t i e s . " ' This
~ ~ loose phrasing can cause much mischief as both the "substantially
similar" and the corporate standards are quite vague.lgO
The question arises-are these new foundations supposed to take over charitable
services of existing money-losing hospitals and HMOs, by providing for the uninsured
and assuming the charity care that the old nonprofit hospital or HMO may have provided? In the absence of an agreement, the for-profit successor will provide less charity
care than the nonprofit hospital.191 The for-profit hospital will often claim that it no
longer has responsibilities for charity care; rather that is the responsibility of the foundation created in the aftermath of the conversion.

187. About two-thirds of new foundations focus exclusively on public health and health care projects,
while most of the remainder have broadened their focus to education, the arts, and other community projects.
See Meyer, supra note 1, at 84.
188. In California, cases support the proposition that a corporation organized exclusively for charitable
purposes holds its assets in trust for the purposes enumerated in its articles of incorporation even if the assets
were not expressly earmarked for charitable purposes when the corporation acquired them. Lynch v. Spilman,
62 Cal.Rptr. 12, 20, 431 P.2d 636, 644 (1967). When a bequest, devise, or donation is made to a charitable
corporation in California, the organization is expected to apply it to the charitable purposes set forth in its articles of association. See Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger, 136 Cal.Rptr. 36, 41 (1977). Therefore, in the
usual hospital conversion, even though the operating assets of a charitable hospital have been sold to a forprofit corporation, a strict constructionist view of cy pres would require the corporation to use the proceeds to
cany out the charity's original purpose. See generally Silk, supra note 73, at 746.13; see also A m . Gen. v.
Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1018-20 (Mass. 1996).
189. See generally In re Multiple Sclerosis Service Organization, 496 N.E.2d 861 (N.Y. 1986).
190. The new California statute regulating conversions states that the entity created in the course of a
conversion be a section 501(c)(3) organization, but the statute does not really address the cy pres issue. CAL.
HEALTH& SAFETYCODEg 1399.72(2).
191. One reason that nonprofits provide more unreimbursed care is that many states condition the property
tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals on providing a substantial amount of charity care. See generally Utah
County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985) (affirming a County board of Equalization's denial of property tax exemption of two nonprofit hospitals because of failure to sufficiently demonstrate they met criteria for being a charity). In 1986, one year after the Hospital Corporation of America acquired Presbyterian Hospital in Oklahoma City, charity care at the hospital dropped to $165,000 from $1.9
million the previous year. However, as a for-profit hospital, Presbyterian now paid $629,554 in property and
franchise taxes, $639,484 in local and state sales taxes, and $397,152 in state income taxes. Additionally, the
Presbyterian Health Foundation, which was created out of the conversion, made thirty-three grants for
$653,722 that year. This constitutes nearly 90% of the grants given to the University of Oklahoma Health Science Center where the hospital and foundation are located. Jay Greene, Charify Care Falls Afer Okla. HosHEALTHCARE,
Mar. 13, 1995, at 36, available at 1995 WL 2495215.
pital's Sole, MODERN

Heinonline - - 23 J. Corp. L. 731 1997-1998

732

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Summer

In California, a dispute arose between the attorney general and the Good Samaritan
Charitable Trust in San Jose over the use of $53 million. The money was received from
the sale of Good Samaritan Health System, specifically for physician and hospital care
for the needy. The former hospital leaders in charge of the resulting foundation wanted to
fund a wider variety of programs than primary health care including meals-on-wheels
and a health library.192 The California Attorney General's position was that primary
health care was the purpose of the original trust for which the money was raised and that
the Family Health Program conversion discussed at the comuse must ~ 0 n t i n u e . lIn~ ~
mencement of this essay, the foundation endowed three chairs in medical schools in California, Utah, and Guam. Board members of foundations who believe that the new foundation should continue the charitable services have funneled support to their former
~~
legally, morally, and socially,
hospitals but not to other health ~ r 0 v i d e r s . lHowever,
these foundations should be independent. In fact, the trustees of these new foundations
are almost all members of former hospital boards.
Another issue is whether these new foundations should make grants completely outside of the healthcare area. Some trustees of these newly created foundations want to
move away from the illness side, such as direct medical care. In Los Gatos, California,
twenty percent of Valley Foundation's $2 million in grants went to the arts. The Jackson
Foundation, born from the sale of Regional Medical Center in Dickson, Tennessee, is
considering financing a sports-training complex, an arts center, and a foreign language
program. It provided two airplanes and made pilot training a free elective at the local
high scho01.l~~
The Rose Medical Center in Denver, formed in the 1940s as a place where Jewish
doctors could practice, was sold to the ColumbiaIHCA chain, creating a $170 million
foundation. It has sponsored a Jewish community festival with music by the Borsht
Brothers band and an Anne Frank contest in schools. The California Wellness Foundation gave money for Little League baseball in South Los Angeles, a world music festival,
public education campaigns on handgun violence, and on how the Republicans "Contract
with America" would cripple federal programs that help ~ h i 1 d r e n . l ~ ~
These are complicated issues about which it is difficult to come to concrete answers
beyond suggesting: 1) a majority of the trustees should not be affiliated with the former
nonprofit or for-profit successor; and 2) in determining the foundation's mission, there
should be some public input and representation on the board. For example, for the first
192. See Greg Jaffe & Monica Langley, Generous to a Fault? Fledgling Charities Get Billionsj?om the
Sale ofNonprofit Hospitals, WALLST. J., Nov. 6, 1996, at Al.
193. The Trust agreed to make 45% of its annual distributions for in-patient hospital care; 31% for outpatient care; 14.3% for school health centers that provide free care to poor children, and the remaining 9.7%
on general health issues. Marchetti, supm note 172, at 15.
194. The Edgewater Foundation created from a hospital conversion reputedly spent $900,000 in its first
five years settling two of the hospital's malpractice suits and paying its water bills as well as unemployment
insurance. See Kane, supm note 182, at 233. The Colorado Trust awarded 40% of its grants in its first six
years to the for-profit hospital who purchased the former nonprofit hospital. See id. When the for-profit decided to reconvert to nonprofit status, the foundation gave the hospital $60 million, half in grant and half in
subordinated debt to support the reconversion. See id. at 233; see also, Bruce Japsen, CEO Profits as Hospital
Changes Status-Again, MODERN
HEALTHCARE,
Oct. 9, 1995, at 50.
195. See Japsen, supra note 194, at 50.
196. See Marchetti, supra note 172, at 14.
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five years of the foundation's existence, there should be a representative of the attorney
general on the board. Public representatives on the boards of private institutions are not
unknown. New York City appoints a representative to the board of the Metropolitan Museum of Art and Carnegie Hall because the City contributes a percentage of the organizations' budget. Perhaps a relator who brought an action on behalf of the public would be
an appropriate appointment.
Although the looser New York approach for charitable corporations seems best
suited,lg7 no matter what cy pres standard is used, the foundation's mission should be
restricted to health care as it is defined by experts in the field. Thus, borscht, a Russian
beet soup, would be allowable, but not the Borscht Brothers band! It should be required
that foundations over a certain size-$50 million-be required to have professional management and have its trustees receive training in foundation stewardship and public re~ ~ o n s i b i 1 i t yThe
. l ~ office
~
responsible for oversight of the conversion should be given a
monitoring role for the first five years of the foundation's existence. This would mean
that the foundation would be expected to file a copy of its 990PF annual report to the IRS
and the Attorney General.
J. Politics and the Conversion Process
One of the most disturbing, yet unsurprising aspects of the state of conversions is
how the wheels of the political process have been greased by the large flow of funds to
decisionrnakers. In the course of the conversion of Virginia's Trigon Blue CrossBlue
Shield to for-profit status in January 1996, the Virginia House majority leader resigned as
Trigon's counsel after it was uncovered that he received $179,000 in legal fees in 1994
during the period negotiations were going on over the price of the conversion.199 In
Georgia, Blue Shield of Georgia was approved for conversion to for-profit status by the
insurance commissioner amidst criticism that special interests behind the conversion financed his campaign. No transfer of assets to a charitable foundation was required in that
conversion. The largest contributor to a candidate running for the Georgia Secretary of
State, who lost, received most of his support fiom entities he helped in the controversial
conversion process to for-profit status.200
Investor-owned hospitals have long been more politically active than nonprofit hosp i t a l ~ When
. ~ ~ ~ColumbialHCA enters markets in pursuit of an acquisition, it retains the
best legal talent; identifies allies among the local civic, political, and medical elite; and
spreads around lots of money. In 1995, ColumbiaIHCA had thirty-three lobbyists in Tallahassee, Florida alone!202
197. See supra notes 186-191 and accompanying text.
198. The $50 million figure is derived from the cut-off size by the Association of Smaller Foundations.
Such a requirement would most likely be negotiated by the attorney general.
199. See Milt Freudenheim, Blue Cross Groups Seek Profit, and States Ask Share of Riches, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 1996, at A l ; Spencer S. Hsu & Peter Baker, Va. Delegate Quits as Insurer's Attorney, WASH.
POST,
Jan. 19, 1996, at B3.
200. See Peter Mantius, Secretary of State Contest is Costliest Ever, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION,
Oct. 8,
1996, at 2C. As noted previously, Georgia Blue Cross owed nothing to the public. See supra note 146; see
also Andy Miller, Questions for Bowers on Blue Cross Deal, ATLANTACONSTITUTION,
Dec. 26, 1997, at E3.
201. See Gray, supra note 38, at 22.
202. See Robert Kuttner, Columbia/HCA + Resurgence of For-profit Hospital Business, NEW ENG.J.

Heinonline - - 23 J. Corp. L. 733 1997-1998

734

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Summer

After years of lobbying in state capitals because their rates were set by insurance
commissioners or some other agency, Blue Crosses have become particularly sophisticated at getting support for conversions.203 The interests seeking to convert nonprofit
entities to for-profit status are bound only by the laws governing political contributions.
However, nonprofit organizations, particularly those seeking to stop these conversions,
are strictly limited in the lobbying and legislative actions they can pursue, and are largely
unsophisticated. While investor-owned chains, such as ColumbiaIHCA, have generated a
backload of unfavorable publicity, the long term political influence remains.
TO CONVERSIONS
VIII. THELEGALRESPONSE

Traditional fiduciary legal doctrines, such as the duty of care, the business judgment
rule, the duty of obedience, and the duty of loyalty, can protect the public's interest in
these transactions with the addition of some statutory assistance. An analogy can be
drawn to the jurisprudence of management buyouts, tender offers, and other changes in
control. These kinds of "organic changes," that is, a fundamental shift in operation, control, or structure, have received increased scrutiny by the courts, particularly in Delaware-the most important corporate law jurisdiction.
A. The Duty of Care
Directors and officers are required to discharge the duties of their respective positions in good faith and with the degree of diligence, care, and skill which ordinary pmdent persons would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions.204 Broadly
stated, a director can neglect her duty of care in two ways: 1) failing to properly monitor
or supervise the corporate entity-the duty of attention; or 2) so long as the director is
disinterested, independent and acting in good faith, by failing to make an informed decision about an important transaction or fundamental change in the way the corporate entity operates-the duty of informed decisionmaking. For purposes of this article, the latter is most important.
In the context of a nonprofit corporation, practical elements of informed decisionmaking would include the following:
1) the opportunity to hear a detailed presentation by management, accompanied by
written materials if appropriate, explaining the rationale for the proposed decision and
why management is making the particular recommendation;
2) the opportunity to hear the advice and recommendation of recognized outside experts, including legal counsel, on the subject;
3) the opportunity to debate and deliberate on the proposal at the board level and, if
possible, to allow a period of several days or weeks for reflection and further consideration before requiring a vote;
4) the gathering of information (where appropriate) from comparable institutions
about how they had dealt with similar situations; and
MEDICME,August 1, 1996, at 448.
203. See Gray, supra note 38, at 22.
204. See PRMCIPLE~
OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
5 4.01 (1994).
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5) the opportunity to request any additional information deemed relevant by a director from management or outside experts, including legal counsel, and time for the directors to consider such additional information.
If the board exercises a duty of care in reaching a decision, and the directors are free
from any conflict of interest with their decisions, then the outcome, even if disastrous to
the organization, will be protected by the business judgment rule, or in the nonprofit
context, the best judgment rule.
B. The Business Judgment Rule as a Safe Harbor for Directors
The Business Judgment Rule raises "a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company."205 However,
the board must exercise the duty of care. The Business Judgment Rule does not protect
decisions by board members who have breached their duty of care by failing to obtain
sufficient information to make an informed decision.206
Delaware cases have given special scrutiny to transactions in which control of the
company will change hands.207 The reason that courts have required enhanced scrutiny
has been the fear that management will regard more favorably those offers that benefit
themselves rather than the interests of shareholders or the corporation. This is human
nature and a subject as much for psychology as for law. Healthcare conversions demonstrate that nonprofit managers are no different than their corporate counterparts, and selfinterest is a major motivating factor.
C. The Duty of Loyalty
A director owes a duty of loyalty to the corporation on whose board he servese208
This duty requires a director to act in a manner that does not harm the corporation. It
further requires a director to avoid using their position to improperly obtain a benefit for
herself or an advantage which might more properly belong to the corporation. That a
transaction involves interested parties is less significant than whether it was fair to the
corporation at the time the decision was made and whether the decision was reached in
an impartial board environment. The fact that a nonprofit's officers or managers will
participate in the for-profit entity is not in and of itself a reason to prohibit the transaction. However, if there is a conflict of interest, the burden is on the directors or senior executives to prove the fairness of the t r a n s a c t i ~ n . ~ ~
205. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984).
206. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).In that case the directors breached the duty of care
by not considering and informing themselves adequately about a sale or the chief executive oficer's role in

promoting the transaction. The board did not independently attempt to value the company, and the decision
was made too quickly to reach an informed judgment. Id. at 874-75.
207. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
208. PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE,
PARTV, DUTYOF FAIRDEALING
(1992).
209. C j PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSISAND RECOMMENDATlONS 8 5.02 (1992).
6 5.02 Transactions with the Corporation (a) General Rule. A director or senior executive who enters into a
transaction with the corporation (other than a transaction involving the payment of compensation) fulfills the
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Corporate law has developed procedures to insulate the interested directors from approving the transaction. When a potential change of control occurs, the board typically
will establish a special committee of disinterested directors to evaluate the transaction.210
This committee will retain its own counsel, investment bankers, and other advisers. This
process-oriented approach ensures a deliberative disinterested decision that will benefit
the corporation's shareholders.

duty of fair dealing with respect to the transaction if:
(1) Disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the transaction is made to the corporate decisionmaker
who authorizes in advance or ratifies the transaction; and
(2) either:
(A) The transaction is fair to the corporation when entered into;
(B) The transaction is authorized in advance, following disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the
transaction, by disinterested supervisor, who could reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to
the corporation at the time of such authorization;
(C) The transaction is ratified, following such disclosure, by disinterested directors who could have reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation at the time it was entered into, provided (I)
a corporate decisionmaker who is not interested in the transaction acted for the corporation in the transaction
and could reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation; (ii) the interested director or senior executive made disclosure to such decisionmaker pursuant to Subsection (a)(l) to the extent he or
she then knew of the material facts; (iii) the interested director or senior executive did not act unreasonably in
failing to seek advance authorization of the transaction by disinterested directors or a disinterested superior;
and (iv) the failure to obtain advance authorization of the transaction by disinterested directors or a disinterested superior did not adversely affect the interests of the corporation in a significant way; or
@) The transaction is authorized in advance or ratified, following such disclosure, by disinterested shareholders, and does not constitute a waste of corporate assets at the time of the shareholder action.
(b) Burden of Proof. A party who challenges a transaction between a director or senior executive and the corporation has the burden of proof, except that if such party establishes that none of Subsections (a)(2)(B),
(a)(2)(C), or (a)(2)(D) is satisfied, the director or senior executive has the burden of proving that the transaction was fair to the corporation.
(c) Ratification of Disclosure of Nondisclosure. The disclosure requirements of 5 5.02(a)(l) will be deemed to
be satisfied if at any time (but no later than a reasonable time after suit is filed challenging the transaction) the
transaction is ratified, following such disclosure, by the directors, the shareholders, or the corporate decisionmaker who initially approved the transaction or the decisionmaker's successor.
4 5.02. Courts have recognized instances such as a change of control where boards of directors may not be
able to exercise their business judgment properly. Because of the omnipresent possibility that a board may be
acting in its own interests in a change of control situation in either opposing or supporting such a transaction,
rather than the interests of the corporation and the shareholders, courts have found an enhanced fiduciary duty
on the board. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946,954 (Del. 1985); Paramount Communications v.
QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,43 (Del. 1993). If a board uses outside investment advisors and a majority
of the directors are outside directors, a court is more likely to support management's action. See Unocal, 493
A.2d at 952-56.
210. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985), the court outlined in detail the fiduciary missteps
of a badly informed board in considering a change of control. In the aftermath of that case, courts, practitioners, and scholars developed techniques to assist judicial approval of management actions. See Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom AJer Van Gorkom, 45 Bus. L. 1, 8-14 (1985)
(describing steps that should be taken to gain protection of the business judgment rule). Two of the common
procedures to establish a fair price are the solicitation of a fairness opinion from an investment bank and the
appointment of a special committee of independent directors to negotiate on behalf of the corporation and the
shareholders. See Richard Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare and the Limits of Fiduciary
Duty,60 N.Y.U. L.REv. 630, 657 (1985); Scott V. Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special CommitteeEnsuring Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Management Leveraged Buyouts and Other
Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest, 43 BUS. L. 665 (1988).
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The chances that a nonprofit board will be taken advantage of and that the charity
will fail to receive maximum value in these transactions is greater than with a business
corporation. This results from the dynamics of nonprofit boards. Most boards of charitable organizations are of a nonadversarial nature, and probing questions are viewed as a
manifestation of bad manners. Secondly, there is a tradition of inattentive or token directors-individuals who are selected for their prestige, name recognition, or affluence,
who have little time to devote to the organization. Virtually all charitable boards consist
of volunteers, who may not have the vested interest that business corporate directors
have. More important in the conversion context is that nonprofit boards have little acquisition experience and, unlike many for-profit directors, have been selected for reasons
I l simply are not in the same
wholly unrelated to their ability to obtain fair v a l ~ e . ~They
league as the acquirers.
Nonprofit boards are unaccustomed to and may be wary of spending scarce resources on investment bankers, accountants, major law f m s , or other intermediaries that
are the glue of for-profit changes in control. Unlike their business counterparts, nonprofit
boards and their organizations exist in the shade. They are not subject to the same scrutiny as for-profit corporations of similar size. There are no shareholders or stock. Nothing
in nonprofit governance resembles the requirement of shareholder approval of changes in
control or the sale of assets because most charities are non-membership organization^.^^^
Disclosure requirements for nonprofit organizations seeking access to capital markets are
less stringent than requirements for for-profit organizations. Nonprofit boards are unfamiliar with valuation and the newer techniques of determining asset worth. In the case of
HMOs, it may be impossible to find disinterested directors.
There is a philosophical question in the conversion context-whom do the boards
represent: patients, the doctors, a part of the public and which sector, or the community
as a whole? It is unclear whether board members know. This is a particularly important
issue with HMOs where boards have not been community-oriented.
IX. DEALING WITH THE CONVERSIONS:
THE STANDARD
OF ENHANCED
SCRUTINY
Nonprofit organizations faced with a conversion should be subject to enhanced
board scrutiny and fiduciary responsibility analogous to the heightened scrutiny that
Delaware courts have imposed upon directors of business corporations in the change of
control context. Courts need to create appropriate or special standards of conduct in the
conversion context and appropriately rigorous standards of judicial review.213 Directors
must engage expert independent outside counsel, seek to consider all alternatives, attempt
to obtain competing offers whenever possible through a market test, and consider com-

21 1 . See Goldschmid, supra note 101, at 1.
212. This does not mean that the organization, for example a museum or symphony, does not have members, but in a legal sense they are merely preferred customers. They do not possess the legal indicia of membership, such as the right to elect directors, sue on behalf of the corporation, or the right to residual value of
the corporation upon dissolution.
213. "A standard of conduct states how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a given role. A
standard of review states the test a court should apply when it reviews an actor's conduct to determine whether
CORPORATIONS
to impose liability or grant injuncture relief." WILLIAML. CARY& MELVINA. EISENBERG,
602 (7th ed. unabridged 1995).
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munity needs. The Delaware standard of care is gross negligence.214 Directors must exercise their duty of inquiry and proceed through a deliberate decisionmaking process.
Directors must disclose all conflicts of interest. They should recuse themselves fiom
voting or participating in decisions in which they have a conflict. When this is impossible, as in the case of an HMO which may have no outside directors, conflicts should be
measured by a standard of intrinsic fairness and the burden of proof should be upon the
interested directors to show fairness. When the board faces decisions and some directors
are interested, the organization should form an independent committee of disinterested
directors. The attached recommendations may not, and should not, prevent conversions,
but will slow them down, requiring their evaluation with the care and scrutiny the public
interest deserves.

214. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 @el. 1985). However, the gross negligence stanJ. CORP. L. 1210, uvaildard is not without criticism. See Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 13 DEL.
able in 1987 W L 28436 (Del. Ch. 1987). The gross negligence standard is not without criticism. In Wilson v.
Brett, 152 Eng. Rep. 737, 739 (1843), Baron Rolfe defined gross negligence as the same thing as ordinary
negligence "with the addition of a vituperative epithet."
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A.

The Conversion Transaction

Advanced court approval in a cy pres proceeding to convert, sell, or enter into
whole hospital or HMO joint ventures with for-profit entities
Detailed public disclosure of the terms of the transaction
Community Benefit Impact Statement
A public Hearing on the impact of the transaction on the delivery of health care
in the community
Specification in the transaction agreement on the continuation of existing health
care, particularly charity care
Provisions for monitoring, independent auditing of health care delivery, and an
enforcement mechanism
Reimbursement of all valuation, attorney, and investment banking fees incurred
by the attorney general or relators

B. Attorney General Intercession
Automatic party to all proceedings
Granted specific authority to seek advanced court approval of transactions
Given statutory authority for appointment of relators in such transactions
Responsible for independent fairness review
C. Board of Directors

Enhanced duty of care standard applied
Require transaction to be approved by independent committee of outside directors
All conflicts of interest must be disclosed and are measured by the standard of
intrinsic fairness
The board is responsible for maximizing value and to have an independent
valuation and fairness opinion
The board should provide for a fair market test whenever possible
A written report discussing grounds for the selection of a particular offer

215. These recommendations are derived in part from: (1) proposed guidelines prepared by the Volunteer
Trustees Foundation for Legal Research; (2) the California Corporations Code section 5913; (3) Review Protocol of Sale of Charitable Assets to For-Profit Entities-Review Protocol, published by the California Ofice of
the Attorney General; and (4) proposals by Robert Boisture, Esq. and Professor Harvey Goldschmid.
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D. Proceeds of Transaction

Assets must be held by a section 501(c)(3) charity
Proceeds must not be used for private benefit; conflicts of interest are prohibited
Any new charitable entity must not be controlled by the for-profit either by
board representation or through grantmaking
The attorney general shall monitor charitable entity for five years after the
creation or conversion transaction
Assets must be utilized for health care
Some public representation on the entity's board should exist
Foundations over $50 million in assets must have professional management and
the boards should receive training in trusteeship
E. Valuation

Duty to seek fair market value
Detailed description of the valuation components and approaches to reaching
price
Competing valuation report by the attorney general or relator
Market test when possible
F. Legislative Action Required

Explicit authority given to the attorney general to participate in all proceedings
during the conversion process
Converting party must fund use of outside experts hired by the attorney general
Attorney's fees paid by converting party in relator actions
Market test required before approval of offer
Public disclosure of all material terms of the agreement
Mandated independent fairness opinion
Board of nonprofit required to consider short and long term impact from the
transaction on the delivery of health care to the community
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